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Recent behavioral and neuroscience evidence suggests that studying the social brain in 
detached and offline contexts (e.g., listening to prerecorded stories about characters) may 
not capture real-world social processes. Few studies, however, have directly compared 
neural activation during live interaction to conventional recorded paradigms. The current 
study used a novel fMRI paradigm to investigate whether real-time social interaction 
modulates the neural correlates of language processing and mentalizing. Regions 
associated with social engagement (i.e., dorsal medial prefrontal cortex) were more active 
during live interaction. Processing live versus recorded language increased activation in 
regions associated with narrative processing and mentalizing (i.e., temporal parietal 
junction). Regions associated with intentionality understanding (i.e., posterior superior 
temporal sulcus) were more active when mentalizing about a live partner. These results 
have implications for quantifying and understanding the neural correlates of real-world 
  
social behavior in typical adults, in developmental populations, and in individuals with 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Humans live in a world filled with reciprocal social interaction, but social 
neuroscientists have almost exclusively studied the brain in offline, non-interactive 
contexts. Paradigms in which participants view static photographs of strangers or listen to 
recorded stories about a character’s false beliefs have yielded insight into how the brain 
processes social stimuli, but such paradigms may misrepresent the real-time workings of 
the human mind (Gallagher, 2012; Gallotti & Frith, 2013; Schilbach et al., 2013). 
Recently, Schilbach and colleagues (2013) urged social neuroscientists to take a second-
person perspective. As compared to a third-person perspective, in which a participant 
observes social stimuli, second-person experiments examine the brain when a participant 
is actively involved in real-time, contingent interaction with another person. This 
approach is predicated on the theory that the brain operates differently during an 
interaction than during traditional offline paradigms. Direct tests of this second-person 
hypothesis, however, are limited. Careful and well-controlled comparisons of brain 
activity during interaction versus observation will vet the second-person hypothesis and 
will improve understanding of how the brain processes real-time social interaction, which 
has implications for understanding typical development and social disabilities. 
There is preliminary evidence that live interaction engages social brain regions 
differentially than recordings of social stimuli (Redcay et al., 2010). This study compared 
participant neural activity when playing a live game over video feed with an 
experimenter versus watching a recorded video of the experimenter from a previous 
game. Several different components of live interaction, however, were conflated during 




responding.  These components often overlapped and the study was unable to disentangle 
which specific factors were responsible for differential brain activation in the live 
condition. Thus, although this study suggests that live interaction affects neural 
responses, it was unable to pinpoint the specific influence of live interaction on particular 
cognitive processes, such as processing live speech outside of the context of also seeing 
the live speaker.  
Two such social cognitive processes of special interest to second-person 
neuroscience are language processing and mentalizing, which is also known as theory of 
mind, and refers to thinking about the thoughts, goals, and desires of others. Rich 
behavioral evidence from both language processing and mentalizing research indicates 
that these processes operate differentially in the presence of live interaction; in contrast, 
the neuroscience investigation of these processes almost exclusively employs third-
person approaches. No study has yet determined how, or even if, the brain processes 
language or mental states differently in a real-time, contingent social interaction as 
compared to listening to similar, but recorded stimuli. 
This Master’s thesis uses a novel functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
paradigm to directly examine the hypothesis that live interaction modulates neural 
activation to social stimuli. I compare brain activation for two events: first, listening to a 
social partner in real-time versus listening to recorded speech, and, second, mentalizing 
about this social partner versus mentalizing about characters in recorded stories. This new 
paradigm provides three main contributions to the social neuroscience literature: first, it 
resolves issues of internal validity present in past studies of live interaction (e.g., stimuli 




second, it extends the second-person perspective to two novel social cognitive domains 
(i.e., language processing and mentalizing); and, third, this paradigm not only examines 
live interaction, but directly compares this live interaction to a traditional third-person 
condition, addressing the question of whether live interaction in and of itself changes the 
neural processes identified by conventional social neuroscience. 
In addition to these contributions, the ultimate goal of this study is to extend a 
second-person neuroscience perspective to developmental populations. Developmental 
research examining the relationship between social cognition and the brain—
developmental social cognitive neuroscience—has yielded insights into the mechanisms 
behind behavior (Diamond & Amso, 2008). Findings from developmental neuroimaging 
have influenced education (e.g., Dubinsky, 2010), social policy (e.g., Johnson, Blum & 
Giedd, 2009), and pediatrics (e.g., Diamond, 2001). In spite of these advances, limitations 
remain in translational neuroscience (e.g., Giedd & Rapoport, 2010), especially in 
identifying the brain bases of social developmental disorders such as autism. One 
potential reason for this limitation is that the offline, third-person approaches used to 
investigate social cognition do not reflect the contingent and reciprocal interactions that 
compose a child’s real-world social life. Given the paucity of current research on second 
person neuroscience, the current study with adults is a necessary preliminary step to 
developmental work for two reasons: first, to resolve practical concerns with this novel 
paradigm, and second, to establish developmental endpoints in order to contextualize 
eventual studies with children. 
In this thesis, I first introduce the relevant behavioral and neuroscience literature 




mentalizing, and discuss the limitations with the current literature related to these social 
cognitive processes. I also outline the research aims of the current study. I next present 
the methods for the present study and explain the novel fMRI task. I end the Method 
section by reviewing my data analysis plan, explaining how I will test my specific 
hypotheses. In the subsequent Results section, I present the results from the current study, 
which indicate that a live context does alter the brain’s response to processing language 
and mental states. Finally, I conclude with a discussion that contextualizes these findings, 
focusing on how this study provides the cornerstone of a larger developmental research 
program. 
The Role of Live Interaction in Modulating Behavior 
 
 Live social interaction—defined as real-time, contingent, and reciprocal 
interaction with a real human partner—is privileged from early infancy. Newborns are 
drawn to faces (Farroni et al., 2005) and biological motion (Simion, Regolin, & Bulf, 
2008), and will imitate the facial expressions of conspecifics (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983). 
By one month of age, infants behave differentially toward people versus objects 
(Trevarthen, 1998), and two-month-old infants are sensitive to contingent social 
interaction presented over live video-feed (Murray & Trevarthen, 1985; Stormark & 
Braarud, 2004; although see Rochat, Neisser, & Marian, 1998). In studies by Murray and 
Trevarthen (1985; 1986), infants and mothers viewed videos of each other via connected 
monitors, and, depending on the condition, the video was either live or recorded. In the 
live condition, both parties were able to interact over the live video feed, and in the 
recorded condition, they saw video from their previous interaction. While viewing 




mothers used less infant-directed speech. These findings indicate that the contingent, live 
response of both the mother and the young infant are crucial to the dynamics of 
interaction. The importance of live interaction grows over the first year of life, as infants 
engage in games, emotional interactions, and protoconversations (non-linguistic back-
and-forth vocal exchanges) with caregivers (Reddy, 2003; Trevarthen, 1998).  
These early perceptual and behavioral biases for live social interaction build to the 
capacity for joint action, in which shared goals represent more than the sum of individual 
minds or actions (Gallotti & Frith, 2013; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 
2005). In the second year of life, infants’ capacity for joint action can be observed in their 
ability to understand and coordinate pointing gestures (Liebal, Bane, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2009), one of several early roots of joint action (reviewed in Carpenter, 
2009). By preschool, children collaborate with adults and appear to find collaboration 
intrinsically rewarding, even when it is not necessary to complete a task (Gräfenhain, 
Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006). Of special 
interest to the proposed study is the finding that preschoolers will coordinate their drum 
beats with a live social partner, but not a recorded sound (Kirschner & Tomasello, 2009).  
Joint action remains a crucial part of social cognition into adulthood, and it has 
been examined in maturity with well-controlled laboratory tasks. For example, 
individuals achieve the same motoric goal more quickly when they believe that they are 
working as part of a group as opposed to working alone (Tsai, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 
2011). Even when the social interaction is reduced to two participants moving cursors on 
a screen, participants are more likely to find each other’s cursors than distractor targets 




The latter study suggests that live interaction is more than contingency alone; the 
shadowed target operated contingently, but did not fool the participants. In sum, 
mounting evidence from behavioral psychology indicates that social interaction produces 
emergent patterns of behavior that are not reducible to the individual level (De Jaeger, Di 
Paolo, & Gallagher, 2010). This is especially for true for two specific social cognitive 
domains: language processing and mentalizing. 
Language processing.   
 Live interaction is necessary for first language acquisition. Very early perceptual 
biases (e.g., sensitivity to contingency and faces) help foster attention to speech (Locke, 
1995), and, by the second half of the first year of life, live interaction is crucial for 
phonetic development. In a classic study, Kuhl and colleagues (2003) found that 
American infants from monolingual English-speaking homes were able to retain their 
ability to discriminate Mandarin phonemes only when they interacted live with a 
Mandarin speaker—watching videos of that speaker did not preserve the contrast. Later 
studies showed that live interaction also increased infant language production (Goldstein 
& Schwade, 2008) and that live interaction could even improve second language learning 
(Verga & Kotz, 2013). Kuhl (2007) has theorized that these effects, at least for infants, 
may be due to increased motivation (via increased arousal and attention) and joint 
attention, perhaps due to the ability of both participants to follow and respond to each 
other’s gaze. This view is supported by more recent evidence from online video-based 
interaction, in which toddlers are able to learn from a social partner over video, as long as 




press). This finding is consistent with the evidence that children as young as two months 
are sensitive to contingencies over video feed (Murray and Trevarthan, 1985).  
Beyond language learning, live interaction influences mature language 
processing. For example, the previously reviewed theory of joint action has been 
extended to language processing in its prototypical live context—back-and-forth 
conversation (Brennan, Galati, & Kuhlen, 2010; Clark, 1996; Garrod & Pickering, 2004; 
Garrod & Pickering, 2009). When engaged in live conversation, speakers use similar 
grammatical structures (Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland, 2000), agree on conversational 
common ground (Brennan & Clark, 1996), and engage in near-seamless turn-taking 
(Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). This synchronous activity extends beyond 
language; speakers in a conversation coordinate their eye movements (Richardson, Dale, 
& Kirkham, 2007) and bodily motions (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Shockley, Santana, & 
Fowler, 2003). These phenomena seem to emerge out of conversation and cannot be 
decomposed into individual behaviors outside of an interactive context.  
Mentalizing.  
 
Mentalizing, or theory of mind, is the understanding that others have mental states 
and that these states can be different from one’s own and from reality. This ability has 
been traditionally indexed by the false belief task, which children pass around age four 
(Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). During this task, children see a character, Sally, 
place a toy in a box. Then, while Sally is out of the room, another character moves the 
toy. To pass, children must explicitly indicate, either verbally or via pointing, that Sally 
will still look for the toy in the original box. That is, they must understand that she has a 




Intriguingly, recent work from young infants and toddlers suggests that children 
pass an implicit version of this test at a much earlier age (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; 
Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007). In these implicit tasks, children show anticipatory 
looks to the box where the character believes the object should be. Related mentalizing 
research has been conducted in samples of adults and children with autism, which is a 
developmental disorder characterized by social impairment. These patient groups fail to 
display anticipatory real-time looking behavior, but, at least in adulthood, often pass 
third-party explicit versions of the false belief task (Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 
2009; Senju et al., 2010). Such findings indicate that there may be dissociable 
mentalizing systems: one may be more cognitive and reflective, and the other may be 
more automatic and more frequently used in spontaneous, naturalistic, second-person 
interaction (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). One theory suggests that, rather than computing 
a social partner’s internal states in a detached way (which can be a route to success in a 
standard explicit theory of mind paradigm), humans use online information from the 
ongoing interaction to guide their real-time mentalizing (Klin, Jones, Schultz, & 
Volkmar, 2003).  
Despite potential alternative mechanisms of real-world mentalizing, behavioral 
paradigms probing the understanding of mental states almost exclusively employ 
recorded, third-person stimuli. Mentalizing, however, is a complex process, and there is 
direct evidence that its subcomponents, such as language and person perception, are 
affected by live interaction. Several studies have found that participants look more at 
videotaped stimuli of people than real people (Foulsham, Walker, & Kingstone, 2011; 




other person’s mental state and a desire to avoid being thought of as impolite or socially 
inappropriate. Further, there is evidence that conversation hinges on theory of mind, 
because individuals need to take into account another’s mental state to chose appropriate 
topics, take turns, and understand referents (Brennan et al., 2010). Thus, there is 
suggestive evidence that mentalizing is different in live contexts, but there has yet to be 
systematic study of this phenomenon.  
Live interaction and social disability.  
 
Evidence from various social disabilities underscores the importance of 
investigating response to live stimuli. Individuals with autism show great impairment in 
real-world social interaction, but often show preserved skills when interpreting offline, 
third-person social stimuli (Klin et al., 2003: Senju et al., 2009). This deficit in live 
interaction appears early in development, as evidenced by the fact that infants at risk for 
autism show atypical patterns of visual fixation to their mothers’ eyes during a live video 
paradigm (Merin, Young, Ozonoff, & Rogers, 2007). Such interaction-specific deficits 
are also present in adults; individuals with autism show an atypical arousal response to 
live versus videotaped social interaction (Riby, Whittle, & Doherty-Sneddon, 2012). 
Evidence from the eye-tracking literature suggests that the differences between typical 
individuals and those with autism are accentuated as the stimuli become more naturalistic 
(e.g., adding motion, sound, realistic scenes; Speer, Cook, McMahon, & Clark, 2007). 
Other social disorders, such as social anxiety, may also be best understood in the context 
of live interaction. For example, a review found that measures of social competence that 
employed complex interactions better predicted symptomatology and outcomes than 




interaction alters behavior differently in typical individuals as compared to individuals 
with social disorders, such as autism. Therefore, systematic examination of what 
components of live interaction alter social cognition could help illuminate the deficits 
underlying these disorders.  
Neuroscience of Live Interaction 
 
Social interactions can be studied in a variety of ways, including sophisticated 
dynamic computational models, more naturalistic studies, or the behavioral paradigms 
reviewed in the previous section. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the ability of 
neuroimaging to illuminate mechanisms underlying behavior (Diamond & Asmo, 2008), 
several recent papers have argued for the application of a live interactive perspective to 
neuroimaging studies (e.g., Guionnet et al., 2010; Tylén, Allen, Hunter, & Roepstorff, 
2012), and some limited literature has pursued this approach. Although not all of the 
extant second-person neuroscience studies directly target the question of processing of 
live versus recorded stimuli, they do elucidate some of the processes involved in social 
interaction. In this section, I review these interactive neuroscience studies as they relate 
to language processing and mentalizing. 
Language processing.  
 
Despite the strong behavioral evidence that live interaction can alter language 
processing, socially interactive neuroscience studies of language processing are quite 
limited and mostly involve conversational paradigms with limited experimental control. 
Suda and colleagues (2010) used functional near-infared spectroscopy (fNIRS) with two 
participants engaged in face-to-face conservation. Compared to the control condition of 




implicated in mentalizing and language. Researchers found that the effect was larger for 
participants who were rated as more cooperative. Later replications with the same design 
found that increased activation during conversation was not present in individuals with 
schizophrenia (Takei et al., 2013), and that typical individuals with more autistic-like 
traits showed smaller increases in activation (Suda et al., 2011). These studies are 
intriguing, but fNIRS has limited spatial resolution compared to fMRI, and these specific 
paradigms have limited experimental control. 
Researchers have also used fMRI hyperscanning techniques—where two 
participants are scanned simultaneously—to study linguistic processing. Stephens and 
colleagues (2010) had one participant tell an unrehearsed 15-minute story in the scanner, 
while a participant in another scanner listened to the live speech. The control stimulus 
was a 15-minute unrehearsed story in a language that the listener did not understand. The 
researchers modeled the similarity of the neural patterns of the speaker and listener in 
both basic auditory and language processing regions and found that the neural patterns of 
the participants became coupled only when the participant understood the live speech, 
with greater coupling associated with improved comprehension.  
 Another recent fMRI hyperscanning study investigated back-and-forth 
conversation (AbdulSabur, 2013). In the experimental condition, participants engaged in 
a conversation, and in the control condition, the participants talked about unrelated 
topics, interrupting each other whenever they chose. The author found increased activity 
in left temporal regions (including regions often associated with mentalizing) when 
participants were having a conversation and found that this increase was accentuated 




the behavioral evidence that the brain is sensitive to the interactive properties of 
conversation; however, results from hyperscanning paradigms are difficult to directly 
compare to third-person, traditional approaches to studying language. 
Mentalizing.  
 
The neural correlates of classic mentalizing paradigms (e.g., false belief 
reasoning) have not been investigated in a second-person context. Joint attention, 
however, has been examined in a contingent, interactive framework (e.g., Redcay et al., 
2010; Schilbach et al., 2010). Although joint attention—or the coordination of two 
individuals’ attention on an object—does not require explicit belief computation, many 
researchers have argued that joint attention is more than reflexive gaze following 
(reviewed in Carpenter & Liebal, 2011). In this framework, true joint attention involves 
shared knowledge that the other party is also directing attention to the same object, and 
thus entails processing and responding to the internal state of another individual. 
Consistent with this perspective, second-person neuroscience paradigms have found that 
joint attention increases activity in traditional mentalizing regions. 
Schilbach and colleagues (2006; 2010) designed a paradigm in which participants 
in an fMRI scanner interacted with a computer avatar—which they believed was 
controlled by a real person—in a joint attention task. Participants either initiated joint 
attention (by looking in a particular direction) or responded to joint attention bids by 
following the avatar’s gaze in a particular direction. As an experimental control, on 
certain trials, the avatar or the participant would respond noncontingently (i.e., look in the 
opposite direction). Researchers found that following the avatar’s gaze increased 




processing, and that directing the gaze of the avatar via initiation of joint attention 
activated reward regions. 
Redcay and colleagues (2010; 2012) examined true face-to-face interaction via 
video feed, in which a participant in the scanner played a live joint attention game with 
an experimenter outside of the scanner. Each individual could see the other’s eye 
movements, and, depending on the trial, either initiated or responded to joint attention 
cues. As with the previous study, the control involved participants responding to non-
social attention cues. Live joint attention, as compared to the control, differentially 
activated regions involved in mentalizing—namely the posterior superior temporal sulcus 
(pSTS) and temporal parietal junction (TPJ). This finding is especially relevant to the 
current study’s paradigm given that these live joint attention games do not involve the 
explicit belief computation required by traditional theory of mind paradigms. Such 
findings indicate that perhaps spontaneous low level mentalizing in real-life contexts 
engages similar regions to more complex mentalizing processes.  
Another relevant line of research comes from game theory and neuroeconomics, 
in studies where researchers examine participants’ brain activity when they are playing, 
or believe they are playing, against a live social partner, as compared to playing against a 
computer. Such comparisons consistently show increased activation in social engagement 
regions when participants are playing against a human. For example, increased activation 
in dMPFC has been observed both in “rock-paper-scissors” and in prisoner dilemma 
games (Gallagher, Jack, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2002; McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith, & 
Trouard, 2001). More recent studies employing a variety of game theory paradigms have 




(e.g., Fukui et al., 2006; reviewed in Camerer, 2008). For example, when participants 
played a human in a multi-step strategy game, they show increased STS activity 
compared to playing a computerized opponent (Coricelli & Nagel, 2007). Further, 
participants who exhibited more high-level strategies also exhibited higher activation in 
social brain regions linked to mentalizing.  
Limitations in the current literature.   
 
In response to this neuroimaging and behavioral evidence, Schilbach and 
colleagues (2013) argued for second-person neuroscience, postulating that the social 
brain operates differently in interaction as opposed to traditional studies of observation 
(e.g., watching a cartoon of Anne moving a toy while Sally is out of the room). Most of 
the extant studies, however, fail to directly address the question of whether the neural 
bases of mentalizing or language are different when considering a third party character 
versus a live social partner. For example, the language studies do not directly contrast 
listening to live versus recorded speech; rather, they contrast simple syllables or 
noncontingent, unrelated speech with back-and-forth conversation. The studies of joint 
attention examine trials in which the avatar (ostensibly representing a real person; 
Schilbach et al., 2010) or experimenter (via videofeed; Redcay et al., 2010) responds to 
joint attention cues and compare these trials to those in which this social partner was 
nonresponsive. Such studies focus on the role of contingency, rather than examining 
whether participating in contingent joint attention with a perceived live social partner is 
different than following identical joint attention cues when such cues are perceived to 
come from a prerecorded computer program. Similarly, the studies involving playing 




recorded social stimuli versus live social stimuli, and instead contrasted real-time social 
contingencies with real-time non-social contingencies. 
In addition to not directly comparing observation versus interaction, the current 
literature is frequently limited by methodological issues, such as experimental control. 
Live interactions can be challenging to script, and it is difficult to determine which 
specific events are of interest in a fast-paced real-time interaction (De Jaeger et al., 2010). 
Hyperscanning data are particularly problematic to interpret, since it is difficult to have a 
priori hypotheses about what coordinated brain activity would look like on a neural level 
beyond simple simultaneous changes in activation. For example, as Konvalinka and 
Roperstorff (2012) discuss, social interaction involves multiple networks operating on 
different time scales, which may require more sophisticated modeling processes than 
those employed by most previous hyperscanning studies.  
Beyond these analytic issues, fMRI analyses require strict control conditions in 
order to ensure that researchers isolate the effect of interest. This consideration, combined 
with the fact that the fMRI scanner is a noisy and isolated environment, make fMRI 
particularly ill-suited to study difficult-to-control live interaction. For example, without 
controlling for attention or motivation, it is possible that any effects of live interaction are 
instead due to differences in attention or stimuli (Redcay et al., 2013). Studies of 
conversation are especially sensitive to confounding variables, as that approach makes it 
difficult to control for low-level characteristics (e.g., length of pauses, speech rate, etc.). 
For example, the control condition in some conversation studies is nonsense syllables, 
which differ from conversation for many other reasons besides being less socially 




context of language processing and mentalizing fails to address a main claim of the 
second-person neuroscience movement—that observation is different from interaction—
either because it is not the direct question of interest or due to methodological limitations. 
Direct comparisons of live and recorded social stimuli.  
 
A very small number of studies have directly compared neural responses to live 
versus matched, recorded social stimuli. For example, Pönkänen and colleages (2011) 
used event-related potentials to compare response to live faces versus static photographs 
of the same faces, for both direct and averted gaze. The live faces were presented from 
behind a shutter that became transparent for the same length of time that the photographs 
were presented. Researchers found that the brain was more responsive to direct gaze for 
only the live condition, and suggested that this finding could reflect increased self-
relevance or spontaneous mentalizing about an imminent social partner. These findings 
are consistent with similar electroencephalography paradigms, which have also found 
differential brain activity for direct versus averted gaze only in the live condition 
(Hietanen, Leppänen, Peltola, Linna-aho, & Ruuhiala, 2008; Pönkänen, Peltola, & 
Hietanen, 2011). 
In the previously mentioned study by Redcay and colleagues (2010), researchers 
contrasted the participant’s brain activity during segments of live interaction over an 
audio and video feed with the experimenter to the activity that occurred while the 
participant viewed recordings of the experimenter from previous sessions (from a prior 
interaction with the same or a different participant). This contrast controlled for the basic 




recorded condition, social regions of the participants’ brains (TPJ and pSTS) were more 
active during the live condition.  
Although such studies are informative, they do not directly address how a live 
real-time social partner changes language processing or mentalizing. For example, in the 
Redcay et al. (2010) paradigm, researchers examined continuous social interaction over 
live video feed, and this interaction was composed of several, often overlapping events, 
including a social partner’s gaze shifts, eye contact, turn taking, and contingent 
responding. Given this design, it was not possible to determine the effect of these 
separate live cues on the resulting neural response.  Disentangling these separate 
processes—for example, examining live language processes separately from eye contact 
or contingency—could help pinpoint the effect of live interaction on separate cognitive 
processes.  Further, this prior study did not explicitly attempt to match attention or 
motivation across conditions beyond instructions. Thus, the question of whether live 
interaction alone modulates the neural correlates of mentalizing or language processing is 
unresolved. Answering this question not only has methodological and theoretical 
relevance, but also may have broader clinical applications. For example, during third-
person mentalizing about recorded stories, individuals with autism activate the same 
regions as typical individuals, despite real-life deficits in mental state attribution (Dufour 
et al., 2013). The characterization of the neural networks involved in real-life social 
processes may improve understanding of social disabilities by elucidating deficits 






Overview of the Socio-Communicative Network 
 
In order to contextualize the current study, it is necessary to briefly review the 
known neural correlates of language processing and mentalizing. The second-person 
approaches reviewed in the previous section constitute the minority of neuroimaging 
investigations in these areas; both processes have been almost entirely understood in a 
third-person context. For example, a common paradigm to examine language processing 
is to contrast responses to prerecorded sentences versus control sentences (e.g., 
backwards speech), and a common paradigm to study mentalizing is to compare 
participant responses to stories about false beliefs to responses to control stories (e.g., a 
photograph depicting an untrue representation of the world, such as a house that later 
burned down). Although these approaches have limitations, they represent an important 
starting point for hypotheses about regions that might be differentially activated by live 
interaction. 
Neural correlates of language processing.  
 
Several meta-analyses (Friederici, 2011; Price, 2010) have revealed a consistent 
set of regions involved in language processing, a ‘language network.’ Regions frequently 
implicated in this network are inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, or Broca’s area), superior 
temporal gyrus (STG, or Wernicke’s area), medial temporal gyrus (MTG), inferior 
parietal regions, and angular gyrus. For most participants, especially those who are right-
handed, language is left-lateralized. 
As the present study is focused on language comprehension, specifically with 
regard to sentence comprehension and prosody, I will focus on these facets of the speech 




perception, there is evidence that right temporal regions are involved in more social 
aspects of speech, including prosodic processing (Friederici, 2002), although there is 
some individual variability (Ethofer, Van De Ville, Scherer, & Vuilleumier, 2009). 
Broadly, the language processing fMRI literature distinguishes between those regions 
involved more in pitch and prosody (i.e., STG) and those regions involved in sentence 
comprehension (i.e., left IFG; reviewed in Price, 2010, although see Frederici, 
Rüschemeyer, Hahne, & Fiebach, 2003 for evidence of superior temporal involvement in 
syntax).  
Neural correlates of mentalizing.  
 
The ‘mentalizing network’ (Frith & Frith, 2003), or the brain regions activated by 
mentalizing, is incredibly robust, with the same core brain regions activated for almost all 
individuals regardless of the specific paradigm. This core network involves bilateral 
temporal parietal junction (TPJ), dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC), anterior 
superior temporal sulcus (aSTS), and precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (PC/PCC; 
Saxe, 2009). As reviewed by Koster-Hale and Saxe (2013), this network is consistently 
activated by stimuli ranging from sentences to cartoons to videos, and by tasks ranging 
from personality judgments to explicit false belief processing to spontaneous mentalizing, 
although the relative strength and pattern of activation may depend on the task.  
Although the regions of this network frequently co-activate, there is evidence to 
suggest that TPJ, specifically right TPJ, is most selective for mental state processing 
(Perner, Aichhorn, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). 
Evidence for this comes not just from fMRI studies, but also lesion (Apperly, Samson, 




Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010). Although there has been controversy 
over whether the TPJ’s selectivity is due to its role in processing unexpected stimuli, 
more recent research indicates that the region’s role in mentalizing is dissociable from its 
role in other cognitive processes (Young, Dodell-Feder & Saxe, 2010).  
In contrast to the highly selective TPJ, evidence indicates that dMPFC may be 
involved in more general social processing (Saxe & Powell, 2006), including personality 
trait judgments (Mitchell, Cloutier, Banaji, & Macrae, 2006), gaze detection (Pierno, 
Becchio, Turella, Tubaldi, & Castiello, 2008), communicative intent processing (Kampe, 
Frith, & Frith, 2003; Schilbach et al., 2006), and animacy detection, even when the 
animate agents are moving triangles (Tavares, Lawrence, & Barnard, 2008). As with the 
TPJ, there have been some claims that the dMPFC is more involved in general cognitive 
processes, but a meta-analysis suggests that it does play a specific role in social 
processing (Van Overwalle, 2011). 
Finally, although not consistently activated in traditional false belief paradigms, 
the posterior region of the STS is activated by a variety social stimuli, including speech 
sounds (Möttönen et al., 2006), faces (Ethofer et al., 2013; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 
2000), biological motion (Kaiser et al., 2010; Puce & Perrett, 2003), gaze shifts 
(Kingstone, Tipper, Ristic, & Ngan, 2004; Pelphrey, Singerman, Allison, & McCarthy, 
2003), and animate agents (Shultz & McCarthy, 2012). Especially relevant to the current 
paradigm is the role of the pSTS, particularly the right pSTS, in processing others’ goals 
and intentions, beyond simply detecting motion or animacy (e.g., Gao, Scholl, & 
McCarthy, 2012; Pelphrey, Morris, & McCarthy, 2004; Shultz, Lee, Pelphrey, & 




Socio-communicative network.  
 
Language processing and mental state processing are often investigated 
separately, but evidence suggests that many regions in the language network and 
mentalizing network overlap as part of a larger socio-communicative network. For 
example, the TPJ is involved in both narrative comprehension and mentalizing (see Mar, 
2011 for a review). Although right IFG is strongly linked to syntactic processing, it is 
also implicated in social behaviors such as irony comprehension (Wang, Lee, Sigman, & 
Dapretto, 2006), and dMPFC, implicated in many studies of social engagement, has also 
been linked to linguistic processes such as metaphor comprehension (Benedek et al., 
2014). Similarly, pSTS is involved in processing syntactic movement (Ben-Shachar, 
Palti, & Grodzinsky, 2004), semantics (Xu, Kemeny, Park, Frattali, & Braun, 2005), 
intention (Pelphrey et al., 2004), and non-linguistic vocal communication (e.g., laughter; 
Shultz et al., 2012). Given the fact that brain regions in the socio-communicative network 
serve multiple functions, assuming that activation in a particular area indexes a particular 
domain-specific cognitive process—language processing versus mentalizing—can be 
problematic (cf. Poldrack, 2011).  
In a review of the varied tasks linked to STS activation, Redcay (2008) posited 
that a common denominator is a task’s social or communicative saliency. That is, the 
broader socio-communicative network may be evidence for a common factor in both 
language processing and mentalizing tasks that modulates activity across these regions. 
One possibility is that this network may ontogenetically result from the fact that language 
and mentalizing are frequently intertwined with social interaction. Given the hypothesis 




my aim in the current study was to determine if live context could change how the brain 
processes social stimuli. That is, I was interested in determining if the brain’s pattern of 
activation in response to language changed as a result of this specific extralinguistic 
factor (i.e., listening to a live speaker). Similarly, my research aim regarding mentalizing 
was to determine if factors beyond the cognitive content of a belief representation were 
able to influence whole brain activation. In this study, the pattern of activated regions was 
not used to infer something about mentalizing versus linguistic processes. Rather, the 
pattern of results was used to determine if live interaction alone was enough to modulate 
activity in regions traditionally assumed to be predominately responsive to the cognitive 
computational aspects of language and mentalizing.  
Current Study 
 
Despite behavioral evidence that live interaction modulates language processing 
and mentalizing, the neural correlates of these processes have been almost exclusively 
characterized in offline contexts. Of the few studies that have taken a more interactive 
approach, most have not directly addressed the question of how live interaction, as 
compared to the observation of recorded stimuli, differently activates the brain. The 
current study aimed to close this gap by examining, in a novel and well-controlled 
paradigm, the neural correlates of language processing and mentalizing in a live, 
interactive context. 
Participants completed a novel fMRI task with three conditions. In the Live 
condition, participants believed they were making choices for a live social partner who 
was conveying her preferences with them over a real-time audio feed. In the two other 




on the expressed preferences of third-party characters. In one of these prerecorded 
conditions, Social, the voice was high-pitched and friendly, and was thus matched to the 
voice in the Live condition. In the second prerecorded condition, Standard, the voice was 
lower-pitched with less prosodic variation. 
In order to provide for tightly controlled comparisons between the Live and Not-
Live conditions, each individual trial proceeded in a specific order. First, the participant 
heard the Story portion, which presented a short spoken vignette (e.g., “There are two 
things on the breakfast menu. One is pancakes and one is a bowl of fruit.”). Then the 
participant heard the audio from the Social Prediction portion, which consisted of a 
spoken preference and question (e.g., “I/Megan am/is trying to eat healthy. Which food 
should I/she eat?”). The participant then chose one of two possible on-screen responses 
and received feedback. The feedback was designed to match attention and motivation 
across all three conditions. To further ensure matched comparison between conditions, 
the stimuli corresponding to the Live condition were prerecorded, although participants 
were led to believe that the presentation was live. This level of control was necessary to 
isolate the effect of a real-time interactive context from other factors such as attention. 
This paradigm aimed to address important gaps in the social neuroscience literature by 
allowing for a direct examination of how a live interaction can change behavioral and 
neural processing. 
Research aims.  
 
 My broad research aim for the current study was to compare social cognition in 




section, I set forth the specific research aims, and later in the Method section, I delineate 
the specific hypotheses and measures (also presented in Table 1). 
Research aims related to behavioral data. The behavioral literature indicates that 
a live interactive context can improve task performance (e.g., Tsai et al., 2011). Further, 
this effect appears to be attenuated in individuals with autism or autistic-like personality 
traits (Freeth, Foulsham, & Kingstone, 2013). My first research aim was to quantify and 
account for individual differences in participants’ subjective perceptions of how live each 
condition seemed. My second research aim was to determine how a live context changed 
the processing of language and mental states, as measured by behavior (i.e., reaction 
time).  
Research aim related to the neural correlates of live language processing. Past 
research has found increased activation in socio-communicative regions during 
conversation, but such research in limited both theoretically and methodologically. 
Specifically, it seems unable to answer the question of whether a live context in and of 
itself changes neural processing when compared to recorded contexts. For this set of 
analyses, I examined the Story portion of the experiment. The only difference between 
conditions was the speakers’ voice and whether the participant believed the speaker is 
live. My research aim was to identify how a live context changed the neural processing of 
language.  
Research aim related to the neural correlates of live mentalizing. Past research 
with joint attention and computer-versus-human strategy games has found evidence for 
increased activity in mentalizing regions in response to human or contingent partners. 





Table 1. Research Aims & Hypotheses 
 
Research Aim 1: Identify how live context behaviorally changes language processing & 
mentalizing 
Hypothesis 1 
Participants’ subjective experiences of “liveness” (based on 
the post-test questionnaire) will be higher in the live 
condition than the two not-live conditions 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2 Participants’ “liveness” ratings will be negatively related to autistic-like personality traits for the live condition only. Supported 
Hypothesis 3 Performance in the live condition will be different than in the not-live condition, as measured by reaction time. Not supported 
Hypothesis 4 
The magnitude by which the live condition affects 
performance will be significantly related to perceived 
“liveness” 
Not supported 
Research Aim 2: Identify how a live context changes neural processing of language 
General 
hypothesis 
Processing speech from a live social partner will modulate 
neural activity compared to matched recorded speech Supported 
Hypotheses about Candidate Regions for Specific Contrasts 
Hypothesis 5 
Live vs. Standard Condition: The Live condition will more 
strongly engage regions of the brain associated with social 
engagement and differentially engage brain regions related 
to pitch and prosody, but will not differentially engage 








Live vs. Social Condition: The Live condition will more 
strongly engage regions of the brain associated with social 




Social vs. Standard Condition: There will be no difference 
between the Social condition and the Standard condition in 
brain regions associated with social engagement or 
sentence comprehension, but there will be a difference in 
language regions related to pitch and prosody. 
Supported  
Research Aim 3: Identify how live interactive context changes neural processing of mental states  
General 
Hypothesis 
Mentalizing about a live social partner will modulate 
neural activity as compared to an identical mental state 
computation about a third-party character 
Supported 
Hypotheses about Candidate Regions for Specific Contrasts 
Hypothesis 8 
Live vs. Standard: The live condition will more strongly 
engage the brain’s mentalizing network and differentially 
engage language processing regions related to pitch and 
prosody, but will not differentially engage sentence 







Live vs. Social: The Live condition will more strongly 
engage the brain’s mentalizing network, but not 









Social vs. Standard: The Social condition will show 
differential activity in regions associated with pitch and 
prosody, but will not show a difference in mentalizing, 





versus a mentalizing about a character in a story, controlling for the content of the mental 
state attribution. To address this question in the present study, I examined the Social 
Prediction period. This included the expression of the social partner (i.e., “my”) or 
character’s preference, the question as to what the social partner (i.e., “me”) or the 
character should do, and the period where the participant saw the answer choices and 
made a response. My research aim was to identify how a live interactive context changed 








Chapter 2: Methods 
Participants 
 
 Thirty-three adults (15 males), aged 18-27 years (M=21.58, SD=2.31), 
participated in the study in exchange for course credit or payment. Participants were 
members of the University of Maryland community, and extensive prescreening 
determined that all participants were native English speakers, had normal hearing, normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision, no first-degree relatives with autism or schizophrenia, and 
no personal history of any neurological impairments or psychological disorders. Two 
participants were not scanned: one was unable to enter the scanner, and one was unable to 
complete the behavioral questionnaires and thus was not scanned. Two further 
participants were excluded due to the fact that they failed to believe that the live 
interaction was live (i.e., in a post-test questionnaire, they explicitly indicated that they 
believed the live stimuli were prerecorded). Thus, the final sample was 29 adults (12 
males) aged 18-26 years (M=21.46, SD=2.09). This sample size is consistent with 
literature on fMRI power, and should reliably detect effects with a fairly conservative 
correction for multiple comparisons, and still preclude spurious results (Desmond & 
Glover, 2002; Thirion et al., 2007; Yarkoni, 2009). The University of Maryland 
Institutional Review Board approved all consent forms and fMRI screening forms, as 
well as all study protocols (Appendix A). 
Procedures 
 
Overview of fMRI stimuli and design.  
 
For the current experiment, all of the stimuli, even for the Live condition, were 




subjects. My main research question, however, was predicated on the participant 
believing that some of these prerecorded interactions were, in fact, live. Therefore, I 
created the illusion that some of the stimuli were live. In the following sections, I first 
explain how this was achieved, and then describe the experimental design and stimuli. I 
end by describing the fMRI image acquisition parameters. 
Creating the illusion.  
 
When a participant arrived at the Maryland Neuroimaging Center (MNC), he or 
she completed the study consent form and re-completed the fMRI safety screening form. 
Next, I took the participant to the “experimenter room” (Figure 1A). There, I explained 
that, for this study, sometimes I would be talking with him or her directly over a live 
audio feed, and sometimes he or she would hear pre-recorded audio from other speakers 
(see Appendix B for the full script). I showed the participant how the laptop in the 
experimenter room was set up with a live video chat connection. I explained that 
participants would be asked questions via audio, and that, for the trials where I spoke to 
the participant live, I would see his or her responses using the web camera in the scan 
room (this camera was pointed at a display that shows which button the participant 
pressed in response to a question; Figure 1B). I explained that I would then open up a 
video link and give feedback (e.g., a thumbs up). For the other trials, I explained that only 
the computer would see the participant’s answer, and would the computer automatically 
show feedback (e.g., a gold star or smiling face). I checked participants’ comprehension 
of these instructions, to ensure that each participant understood that there would be a live 




Once the participant was in the scanner, I talked to him or her from the 
experimenter room over a truly live video chat (Figure 1C), and gave clues to indicate the 
chat was live (e.g., “Hi [participant name], glad you were able to wear your contacts 
today”). During this portion of truly live interaction, we practiced some of the button 
presses (e.g., I said “Press 1 if it’s Tuesday and 2 if it’s Wednesday”). The participant 
saw the button that he or she pressed light up on our mutual chat screen, and then I gave 











Figure 1. Experimental setup for creating the live illusion. Before the study begins, the 
participant views the experimenter room (A), where I have set up a live video chat. The 
webcam on the laptop in the experimenter room is trained on my face. The second 
webcam in the video chat (B) is trained on a button display, which will light up when the 
participant inside the scanner presses a button. When inside the scanner, before the main 
experiment begins, the participant views a screen depicted in (C). The participant sees my 
face and hears me talking to them. I ask them a question (e.g., press 1 if it is summer and 
2 if it is winter). Immediately after pressing the button (in the case of (C), the button is 2), 
the participant sees their choice illuminated and thus knows that I have also seen their 







After this portion of truly live interaction was over, we did a brief set of practice 
trials in the style of the actual experiment (i.e., prerecorded “Live” trials). After these 
trials, we returned to the truly live video chat, and I commented on the question I just 
“asked”, reinforcing that I was talking to the participant live and that I was able to see his 
or her responses. After this final portion to solidify the live illusion, the main experiment 
began. 
Stimuli presentation in the scanner.  
 
Participants viewed 36 individual trials in the scanner (Appendix C), evenly 
distributed across 4 runs. For each trial, participants listened to a short story that 
presented two options, then heard a question about what I, or a third-party character, 
should do (Figure 2). The participant picked one of the options via button press. After 
making the choice, participants saw contingent feedback. The task was programmed and 
presented using the Psychophysics Toolbox Extension for MATLAB 7.6 (PTB-3; 
Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). For the purposes of the current study, two events were of 
interest: first, the Story (e.g., “There are two things on the breakfast menu. One is 
pancakes and one is a bowl of fruit.”), and second, the Social Prediction period. The latter 
consisted of the prompt (e.g., “I/Megan am/is trying to eat healthy”), the question (e.g., 
“Which food should I/Megan eat?”), and the participant’s choice. The feedback portion 
was designed to ensure that motivation and attention were the same in both Live and Not-
Live trials; the issue of mismatched attention has been a problem in past studies of live 
interaction (reviewed in Redcay et al., 2013). The accuracy and reaction time (RT) of the 
participant’s choice was recorded. Participants had three seconds to respond before their 




Figure 2. Experimental trial structure. The three conditions (Live, Social, and Standard) 
are depicted in the three columns. The specific events of interest for the current study 
(story and social prediction) are bolded and underlined. All participants were presented 
twelve unique trials in each condition. s=seconds. 
 
Each participant viewed trials from the three conditions discussed previously 
(Live, Social, Standard). For the Live condition, participants heard my prerecorded voice 
and, for feedback, saw a video of me (e.g., giving a thumbs up or down). For the Social 
condition, participants heard a friendly speaker and feedback consisted of a standardized 
picture of a happy or sad Caucasian female (NimStim; Tottenham et al., 2009). For the 
Standard condition, participants heard a lower-pitched female speaker and feedback 
consisted of a gold star or red “x”.  
During the audio portion of the Live trials, a black screen reading “LIVE VOICE” 
in green text was present. For the Social and Standard trials, a black screen reading 
“RECORDED” in orange text was displayed. The same screen was also displayed for two 







































A 2-4 second jitter, consisting of a fixation cross, was present between the Story 
and the Social Prediction, and between the Social Prediction and seeing the feedback. 
This jitter allowed us to estimate the effects of these events. There were also 20 seconds 
of baseline (i.e., a fixation cross) at the beginning and end of each run, and an additional 
20 seconds of baseline in the middle of each run. The distribution of the trial types (i.e., 
Live, Social, Standard) and the timing of the jitters and inter-trial intervals were 
determined by the program OptSeq (http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/), to ensure 
the optimal timing allowing for independent analysis of the events. This model was 
further tested for colinearity using AFNI’s 3dDeconvolve (Cox, 1996; 
http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/), and analysis revealed that all beta values of interest were 
estimable. 
Stimuli characteristics.  
 
Item piloting. The final items that made up the 36 experimental trials were 
selected from a set of 126 candidate items. These 126 candidate items were piloted on a 
sample of eight typical adults, recruited from the University of Maryland graduate 
student population. Items were excluded if any of the following conditions were met: 
accuracy of 50% or less, the mean RT or standard deviation (SD) of mean RT was more 
than two SD away from the mean RT for all 126 items, or the number of syllables was 
more than two SD away from the mean. Consistent with the ultimate aim of extending 
this paradigm to a developmental population, the selected subset of 103 items was then 
tested with a group of seven typical children, aged 8-11. After this testing, 30 easy items 




selected (on which child accuracy ranged from 43% to 72%). The high number of easy 
items was designed to ensure that participants would see mostly positive feedback.  
The 30 easy items were selected out of a set of 64 items on which both age groups 
got 100%. These 30 items were selected because they were closest to the mean child RT. 
The six hard items were chosen out of the 19 items on which children got between 43% 
and 72% accuracy and were selected such that average RT was matched between the easy 
and hard items. For the trials with a third-party character name, each name was picked at 
random from the US Social Security Administration’s list of the top 100 American names 
for male and female infants born in 2000-2009 (roughly the years in which the planned 
eventual child sample for the current study would have been born; 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/). 
Audio stimuli. Each of the three trial types (i.e., Live, Social, Standard) had a 
single speaker, and this speaker was held constant across participants. All 36 items were 
recorded by each speaker (although any individual participant heard each item read by 
only one speaker, according to the randomization process). In order to ensure that 
differences in speaker audio characteristics would not drive any effects, each speech file 
was normalized to 60 dB. After normalization, the speakers were compared on pitch, 
volume, and length of the audio segment (Table 2). This is an approach that is consistent 
with other literature on fMRI language processing (e.g., Shultz, Vouloumanos, & 
Pelphrey, 2012). All features were extracted using Praat 5.3 (Boersma, 2002; 
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/praat/). As expected, the Standard speaker was significantly 
lower-pitched. The Live and Social speaker were matched on volume and pitch for the 




higher pitch, which is a feature of infant-directed speech (e.g., Trainor & Desjardins, 
2002). Therefore, the Social speaker was either matched to, or even friendlier, than the 
Live speaker for both events of interest. With respect to the length of the Story portion, 
the difference between conditions for any particular item was always less than 500 
milliseconds. The Live social prediction audio was the shortest in duration, due to the fact 
that the Live speaker is using the monosyllabic “I” instead of a potentially multi-syllabic 
name. 














Note. Values are mean (standard deviation). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were made 
using a Tukey’s test of multiple comparisons with an alpha of .05. Abbreviations: 
s=seconds; dB=decibels; Hz=Hertz. **, p <.01; ***, p<.001. 
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Visual stimuli. The screens reading “LIVE VOICE” and “RECORDED” were 
matched on number of letters and on luminosity. The feedback stimuli were not matched 
on visual characteristics, but all of the stimuli were silent and presented for two seconds. 
Randomization.  
 
Each participant was assigned one of three stimuli sets. The three sets differed 
based on which of the 36 items were presented in the Live, Social, and Standard 
conditions. There were always 12 items in each condition and each item was represented 
in each condition once. The allocation of these items within each of the three potential 
stimuli sets ensured that the total amount of time for each condition was matched (e.g., 
participants heard each speaker for the same amount of time). Additionally, each 
participant was be assigned to one of four run orders. Within each run, the timing and 
order of the trial types was predetermined, using the OptSeq procedure described 
previously (e.g., a run might start with two Social items, followed by a Live item). 
Between one and two of the hard items were selected for each run, and the rest of the 
items for that run were classified as easy (based on the piloting data with children). Based 
on these constraints, items were randomly assigned to different positions within the runs 
(e.g., the Live item selected could be any of the 12 possible Live items for that 
participant). The participant’s stimuli set (i.e., which items were assigned to which 
condition) and run order were predetermined to ensure that all possibilities were 
represented over the course of the study. 
fMRI image acquisition procedure.  
 
fMRI imaging data were collected using a 12-channel head coil on a single 




System, Siemens Medical Solutions). The scanning protocol for each participant 
consisted of four runs of the experiment (T2-weighted echo-planer gradient-echo; 36 
interleaved axial slices; voxel size=3.0 x 3.0 x 3.3 mm; repetition time=2200ms; echo 
time=24ms; flip angle=90°; pixel matrix=64 x 64), and a single structural scan (three-
dimensional T1 magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo sequence; 176 contiguous 
sagittal slices, voxel size=1.0 x 1.0 x 1.0 mm; repetition time=1900ms; echo 
time=2.52ms; flip angle=9°; pixel matrix= 256 x 256). 
The parameters for the functional scans were selected after piloting with four 
typical adults. The four combinations of two potential echo times (TE=24ms and 
TE=28ms) and two potential bandwidth lengths (2234 and 2442) were tested across each 
participant’s four runs. This allowed intra- and inter-individual comparisons of the four 
protocols. I compared within-subject signal levels across all four combinations, 
specifically in regions prone to signal dropout (e.g., reward regions in ventral striatum). 
The parameters that best allowed signal preservation while maximizing specificity were 
TE=24ms and a bandwidth of 2234, and these parameter values were used for the 
experimental scanning. 
Behavioral assessments.  
 
Participants completed three behavioral assessments after completing the fMRI 
portion of the experiment. 
Autism Quotient. (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubbley, 
2001; Appendix D). The 50-item autism quotient (AQ) is used to measure autistic-like 
traits in the typical population. Scores on this measure for typical adults have been shown 




emotional faces (Gayle, Gal, & Kieffaber, 2012), and perceptual learning (Reed, Lowe, & 
Everett, 2011). For each AQ item (e.g., “I find social situations easy”), participants 
answered on a 1 (definitely agree) to 4 (definitely disagree) Likert scale. Half the items 
were reversed scored. Answers of strongly agree and slightly agree were collapsed 
together, as were answers of strongly disagree and slightly disagree, and participants 
received either a 1 or a 0 for each item. Higher total scores indicate more autistic-like 
traits. For the current study, participants completed a pen-and-paper version of this 
assessment and were not told what the questionnaire was assessing. 
Demographic questionnaire. (Appendix E) Participants completed a standard 
demographics questionnaire, including measures of handedness, race, and parental 
education. 
Post-test questionnaire (Appendix F) Past studies of live interaction with an 
element of deception have employed post-test questionnaires to ensure that the illusion 
was successful (e.g., Schilbach et al., 2010; Teufel, Fletcher & Davis, 2010). For this 
current study, participants completed a 40-item post-test questionnaire to assess how live, 
likeable, and direct each participant found each of the three speakers (Live, Social, 
Standard) on a 1 to 7 point Likert scale. Participants were also asked to describe their 
impressions of the experiment, including whether or not they felt there was anything 
more to the study than they were told about. This procedure is standard in studies 
involving deception, because it does not prime a particular type of answer (e.g. Fazio & 
Zanna, 1978). Participants completed this assessment using a computer-administered 
Qualtrics survey, and no member of the experimental team was present while the 




given a slightly different version of the survey than its final form, and Appendix F 
denotes which items were included for each participant. 
Debriefing.  
 
At the end of the study and the post-test questionnaire, participants were debriefed 
(see Smith and Richardson, 1983 for more on the importance of debriefing). They were 
told that what they thought was live was actually prerecorded, and that this deception was 
necessary in order to control the exact characteristics of the audio and video stimuli. 
Participants were also asked specifically at this time if they had any suspicions about the 
live stimuli. Finally, they were given the IRB-approved debriefing sheet (included in the 
IRB materials in Appendix A).  
Data Analysis & Hypotheses 
 
Preliminary behavioral data analysis.  
 
RT data were cleaned in a two-step process. First, RTs with values of less than 
50ms were excluded because such short responses likely do not reflect true performance 
(Baayen & Milin, 2010). RTs were then inversely transformed, which is preferable to 
trimming longer RTs, given the limited variability in the current dataset due to the three-
second response window (Ratcliff, 1993). Finally, since participants completed slightly 
different versions of the post-test questionnaire (e.g., some of the participants answered 
fewer questions attempting to measure subjective perceptions of how live each speaker 
seemed), all Likert scale items relating to how live a particular condition seemed were 
averaged together, yielding a single composite score, or liveness score, for each 
participant for each condition’s speaker. A similar composite scale was constructed for 




participant reported being attentive to and motivated by each condition (engagement). 
After these preliminary steps, the specific hypotheses, detailed below and in Table 1 
could be tested.  
Testing behavioral hypotheses.  
 
 For the behavioral data, I hypothesized that, based on the post-test questionnaire, 
participants would rate their subjective experiences of live interaction as higher in the 
live condition than the two not-live conditions (Hypothesis 1; Table 1). Further, given 
difficulties with live social interaction for people with autism, I hypothesized that the 
subjective ratings of liveness for the Live condition would be negatively related to AQ 
scores, which measures autistic-like personality traits (Hypothesis 2). To test Hypothesis 
1, I compared the liveness composite score from the post-test questionnaire (detailed in 
the previous section) across all three conditions using a repeated measures ANOVA, and 
used a linear contrast to test the explicit prediction that that perceived liveness would be 
highest for Live, followed by Social and then Standard. To test Hypothesis 2, I examined 
the correlation between subjective liveness ratings for the three conditions (Live, Social, 
and Standard) and AQ scores. I also examined this relation controlling for scores on post-
test questionnaire items measuring condition engagement and likeability, to ensure that 
any effects were driven by perceived liveness alone.  
I also hypothesized that individuals would be faster to respond to questions in the 
Live conditions as compared to the two Not-Live conditions (Hypothesis 3), and that the 
magnitude of improved performance would be related to perceived liveness (Hypothesis 
4). To test the effect of condition on performance, I used a repeated measures ANOVA to 




Hypothesis 1, this was based on the a priori hypothesis that Social performance will fall 
in-between Live and Standard performance. To test Hypothesis 4, I first calculated the 
degree to which the live condition affected performance by subtracting the average 
(cleaned) Live RT from the averaged Not-Live RT. More positive numbers indicated a 
larger time advantage for the Live condition. I next examined the relation between this 
variable and each participant’s liveness rating for the Live condition using a Pearson’s 
correlation.  
Finally, for both Hypothesis 3 and 4, I did not have a hypothesis about the 
specific direction of the effects. Although there is evidence that belief computation can be 
faster than similar types of physical computations (Saxe, Shultz, & Jiang, 2006), such 
studies did not directly compare belief computations under different degrees of social 
saliency. It is possible that the live context could induce anxiety, superfluous thoughts, or 
more in-depth processing, which could slow performance. Thus, all behavioral 
hypotheses were tested using two-tailed tests with an alpha of .05 with SPSS 20.0. 
fMRI preprocessing.  
 
Image preprocessing was performed using SPM8 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm), and preprocessing steps were similar to another study 
that examined the neural correlates of live joint attention (Redcay et al., 2012). For the 
present study, the data were collected using an interleaved scheme, and were thus slice-
time corrected, then realigned to the original volume from the first functional run, and 
then normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template brain using both 
linear and non-linear transformations. Data were low-pass filtered (1/128 Hz) and 




Outlying volumes (i.e., due to motion or global signal) for each participant were 
detected using the artifact detection toolbox (http://nitrc.org/projects /artifact_detect). A 
volume was identified as a motion outlier if the difference between two consecutive 
volumes exceeded 1mm (averaging across translational and rotational movements). The 
threshold for a global signal outlier was three SD from the mean global signal. These 
outlying time points were considered as individual regressors in subsequent analysis (see 
following section). Participants were to be excluded if, on two or more runs, their number 
of motion or global signal outliers exceeded 15% of collected volumes or if total motion 
exceeded 4mm. No runs, however, met these criteria, so all runs were included for all 
participants (n=29). 
fMRI data analysis.  
 
I conducted both first-level and second-level analyses. First-level analyses were 
conducted for individual participants; the resulting estimates of condition effects for each 
participant were analyzed at the group level in second-level analyses. For the first-level 
analyses, for each run, I compiled a data file with the onsets and durations for the events 
of interest (i.e., for all three conditions, the language processing Story period and the 
mentalizing Social Prediction period) and the events of no interest (i.e., the two seconds 
before the trial started and the feedback periods). Using SPM8, I convolved the stimulus 
duration and onsets with the canonical hemodynamic response function. Then I created a 
general linear model for each voxel across all four runs and all time points. This model 
estimated the fit of each subject’s convolved blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) 
signal with our model of when stimuli were presented. That is, in this model, all six 




Story, Live Social Prediction, Social Social Prediction, Standard Social Prediction). This 
model also included, as regressors of no interest, the anticipatory periods and the reward 
periods. All six motion parameters (roll, pitch, yaw, x, y, and z) were included as 
regressors in this model, as was each individual outlier (such that the value for that outlier 
was 1, and all other values in the vector were zero), although these were not events of 
interest.  
For the second-level analysis, individual participant results were analyzed at the 
group level for the following contrasts: Story (across all conditions) vs. baseline (fixation 
crosshair), Social Prediction (across all conditions) vs. baseline, and all six individual 
events of interest vs. baseline. I also analyzed specific contrasts to specifically examine 
the effect of live interaction on language processing (i.e., Live Story vs. Social Story, 
Live Story vs. Standard Story) and the effect of live interaction on mentalizing (i.e., Live 
Social Prediction vs. Social Social Prediction, Live Social Prediction vs. Standard Social 
Prediction). I also examined two contrasts to determine the effect of a recorded speaker’s 
prosody and pitch on language processing (Social Story vs. Standard Story) and 
mentalizing (Social Social Prediction vs. Standard Social Prediction). For those contrasts, 
and the contrasts with baseline, I used a whole-brain random effects analysis, using 
SPM8 and in-house MATLAB scripts. To determine whether contrasts were significant, I 
used a two-tailed t-test. I first used a cutoff of p < .001 to threshold the contrasts maps. 
Then, to correct for multiple comparisons, I used SPM’s false discovery rate (FDR) 
algorithm to determine which cluster size threshold that maintained an overall alpha of 





Testing neural hypotheses.  
 
 Given the preliminary nature of this study, I employed whole-brain analyses, 
instead of limiting the analysis to specific regions of interest. Social brain regions are 
difficult to precisely anatomically define, and it is challenging to extrapolate specific 
activation coordinates from previous studies, as these previous studies have almost 
exclusively taken a third-person perspective. Thus, using anatomical or functional maps 
to restrict data analysis to particular regions could obfuscate important trends in the data. 
For this study, I created tables with all significant regions for all contrasts, in order to 
fully examine the effects of the experimental conditions, and I considered the full 
activation pattern and regions in tandem. With that caveat, I did have a set of candidate 
regions that I was interested in for each individual hypothesis, detailed below.  
 Language processing. For the Story portion of the experiment (i.e., the portion 
matched on linguistic content), I conducted three pairwise comparisons, such that each 
condition (Live, Standard, Social) was compared to each other condition. These 
comparisons contrasted listening to speech from a live social partner with listening to 
prerecorded speech, and also differed in terms of prosody between the Standard versus 
the Live and Social conditions. I hypothesized that the comparison between live and 
prerecorded speech would differentially activate regions associated with social 
engagement (i.e., dMPFC), and that contrasts between speakers with different prosody 
levels would differentially engage pitch and prosody regions (i.e, STG).  
 Specifically, for the comparison of the Live and Standard conditions, I predicted 
that the Live condition would more strongly engage regions of the brain associated with 




(Hypothesis 5; Table 2). I predicted that the Live and Social conditions would not 
differentially activate pitch and prosody regions, but that the Live condition would more 
strongly activate regions associated with social engagement (Hypothesis 6). Finally, for 
the comparison of the two Not-Live conditions, I hypothesized that there would be no 
differential activation in social engagement regions, but differential activity in auditory 
speech processing regions (Hypothesis 7). Additionally, given the matched syntactic 
content between conditions, for each comparison, I also predicted that there would be no 
difference between conditions in activation for regions related to sentence comprehension 
(i.e., left IFG; Hypotheses 5-7).  
 Mentalizing. For the Social Prediction part of the experiment, which consisted of 
the prompt, question, and choice segments, I again compared each condition to each other 
condition. These comparisons contrasted mentalizing about a character in a story versus 
mentalizing about a real-life social partner, and I predicted the mentalizing network (i.e., 
TPJ, dMPFC, PCC) would be more activated for the real-life partner. This network 
subsumes the social engagement region (i.e., dMPFC) from the language processing 
comparisons in Hypotheses 5-7. The predictions regarding mentalizing are consistent 
with past literature suggesting that dMPFC is engaged in broader person perception and 
social engagement, and that regions such as the TPJ are selectively activated by belief 
processing (e.g., Saxe & Powell, 2006). Given the strong role of executive function in 
mentalizing (Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002), combined with the potential differential 
attention to second-person versus third-person descriptors (e.g., “I” vs. “Megan”), I 




 Specifically, comparing the Live and Standard conditions, I predicted differential 
involvement of the pitch and prosody regions outlined previously, and increased 
activation during the Live condition in the mentalizing network (Hypothesis 8). For the 
comparison between the pitch-matched Live and Social conditions, I hypothesized 
equivalent activation in pitch and prosody regions, but increased activation for the Live 
condition in the socio-communicative network, specifically in regions implicated in 
mentalizing studies (Hypothesis 9). Finally, for the comparison between the two Not-
Live conditions, I predicted equivalent activation in mentalizing regions, but increased 
activation for the higher pitched Social condition in pitch and prosody regions 
(Hypothesis 10). Given efforts to match linguistic and attentional demands, I did not 
predict differential activity in the syntactic processing regions detailed for the previous 
hypotheses, nor did I predict differential activation in the attentional network 




Chapter 3: Results 
Behavioral Results 
 
Subjective impressions of perceived liveness.  
 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition (Live, 
Social, Standard) on subjective ratings of liveness (F(2,56)=39.99, p<.001), and the linear 
contrast was also significant (F(1, 28)=65.23, p<.001; Table 3). 
 












Note. Values are mean (standard deviation). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were made 
using a Sidak correction for multiple comparisons at an alpha of .05. Untransformed RTs 
are reported in the table, but statistical tests were performed on inverse transformed RTs. 
All post-test questionnaire ratings are on a 1 to 7 scale. When assumptions of spherecity 
were violated, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was employed. Abbreviations: 
RT=reaction time; ms=milliseconds. ***, p<.001. 
 
Thus, as predicted in Hypothesis 1, liveness ratings were highest for the Live 
condition. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, AQ scores were significantly correlated with 
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perceived liveness for the Live condition (r(27)=-.40, p=.03; Figure 3), but not the Social 
(r(27)=-.27, p=.17) nor Standard (r(27)=.13, p=.49) conditions, such that more autistic-
like personality traits were related to less of a subjective sense of live interaction during 
the Live condition. The correlation between AQ scores and perceived liveness remained 
significant after controlling both for self-reported engagement during the live condition 
























Figure 3. Correlation between participants’ liveness ratings for the Live condition and 
autism quotient (AQ) scores.  Higher AQ scores indicate more autistic-like personality 
traits.  Participant liveness ratings were averaged across several questions that assessed 
how direct the interaction seemed and how much it seemed like someone was in the 
scanner talking to the participant versus sounding like a prerecording.  Possible scores 





Behavioral effect of live context on processing language and mental states.  
 
In the test of the effect of condition on RT, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed 
no significant effect (F(2,56)=.52, p=.60), and the linear contrast was also not significant 
(F(1,28)=.14, p=.71). Thus, Hypothesis 3 was not supported; there was no effect of live 
interaction on behavioral performance when mentalizing about a live social partner 
versus a third-person character. Consistent with this lack of an effect of condition on 
behavioral performance, Hypothesis 4 was also not supported; differences in RT between 
the Live and Not-Live conditions were not correlated with the perceived liveness of the 
Live condition (r(27)=.26, p=.18). That is, the relative change in performance during the 
live interaction versus recorded segments was not related to a participant’s subjective 
judgment of how live the interaction seemed.  
Neuroimaging Results 
 
The effect of a live context on the neural processing of language.  
 
As hypothesized, processing speech from a live social partner modulated neural activity 
compared to processing content-matched recorded speech (Table 4). The specific pattern 
of results for the candidate regions was broadly consistent with Hypotheses 5-7: whole-
brain comparisons of the Live condition to the two Not-Live conditions revealed 
activation in regions often associated with social processing and engagement, but the 
comparison of the two Not-Live conditions only implicated regions involved in pitch and 
prosody processing. Corrected whole-brain comparisons for the Live versus Social 
conditions revealed significant activation in dMPFC and left TPJ (Figure 4). The 





Table 4. Regions Showing Differences Between Conditions for the Syntactically-Matched 
Story Portion. 
 





       x               y                z 
EFFECT OF LIVE INTERACTION (MATCHING PITCH/PROSODY) 
Live>Social 
Angular gyrus L 4.54 93 -34 -78 42 
TPJ L 5.09 382 -38 -56 32 
dMPFC L 5.08 108 -8 50 28 
dMPFC R 5.39 152 12 56 28 
Social>Live 
Lingual gyrus L -5.56 482 -18 -94 -4 
Lingual gyrus R -4.82 164 22 -94 4 
EFFECT OF LIVE INTERACTION (MISMATCHED PITCH/PROSODY) 
Live>Standard 
mid-STS/pSTS R 7.18 903 48 -30 2 
Standard>Live 
Putamen L -5.45 146 -28 -4 6 
Putamen R -5.25 180 32 -8 4 
EFFECT OF PITCH/PROSODY (MATCHED ON NOT-LIVE CONTEXT) 
Live>Standard 
STG R 5.72 184 64 -22 6 
Standard>Live 
None 
Note. TPJ=temporal parietal junction; dMPFC=dorsal medial prefronal cortex; 
pSTS=posterior superior temporal sulcus; STG=superior temporal gyrus. All coordinates 



























































Social vs. Baselin !
Standard vs. Baseline!
 
Figure 4. Effect of live context on the neural correlates of language processing. (A) The 
contrasts for the Story portion between all three conditions. This lateral image depicts 
false detection rate corrected (p<.05) activation up to 16 voxels deep. (B) Activation 
relative to baseline. Right STS is defined based on the Live>Standard contrast, and all 
other regions are defined based on the Live>Social contrast. Baseline was a fixation 
crosshair on a black screen.  Bar graphs are intended to provide an illustration of 
activation versus baseline and are not presented for statistical purposes.  Abbreviations: 






activation in temporal cortex, encompassing mid-STS and extending toward pSTS. 
Surprisingly, dMPFC was not more active in the Live than Standard condition, although 
this activation did emerge at a lower threshold (p<.001, k>25; [12 58 24], t=4.99). The 
comparison of the two Not-Live conditions, Social versus Standard, revealed activation 
only in STG.  
The effect of a live context on the neural correlates of mentalizing.  
 
 Again, as hypothesized, mentalizing about a live social partner modulated neural 
activity as compared to an identical mental state computation about a third-party 
character (Table 5). Broadly consistent with Hypotheses 8-10, whole-brain comparisons 
of the Live versus Not-Live conditions revealed increased activity in brain regions 
frequently implicated in social engagement and goal and intention processing. Again, 
these regions were not active when comparing the two Not-Live conditions, which varied 
on speaker pitch, prosody, and perceived likability, but not liveness. Specifically, the 
comparison between Live and Social Conditions revealed activity in bilateral pSTS and 
right superior posterior frontal gyrus (pSFG; Figure 5), and there was some overlap with 
the left pSTS activation from the Story portion of the experiment (Figure 6a). The whole-
brain comparisons for the Live versus Standard conditions revealed increased activation 
in dMPFC, bilateral pSTS, right mid-STS, and right pSFG, but not TPJ. The contrast 
between the Social and Standard conditions only revealed increased bilateral STG 
activation, and even a more liberal threshold (p>.001, uncorrected), did not indicate 






Table 5. Regions Showing Differences between Conditions for the Social Prediction 
Portion.  
 





       x               y                z 
EFFECT OF LIVE INTERACTION (MATCHING PITCH/PROSODY) 
Live>Social 
pSTS L 7.91 346 -52 -58 16 
pSTS R 7.23 536 48 -66 12 
pSFG R 5.18 106 12 10 70 
Social>Live 
STG L -6.04 566 -60 -8 14 
STG R -5.34 174 56 -10 6 
EFFECT OF LIVE INTERACTION (MISMATCHED PITCH/PROSODY) 
Live>Standard 
pSTS L 8.20 424 -46 -66 10 
pSTS R 8.19 872 44 -64 10 
dMPFC R 5.18 233 6 50 26 
pSFG R 5.51 148 8 14 64 
STG R 5.77 467 58 -26 -10 
Standard>Live 
None 
EFFECT OF PITCH/PROSODY (MATCHED ON NOT-LIVE CONTEXT) 
Live>Standard 
STG L 5.67 332 -60 -20 -4 
STG R 5.86 114 60 -12 -10 
Standard>Live 
None 
Note. pSTS=posterior superior temporal sulcus; pSFG=posterior superior frontal gyrus; 
STG=superior temporal gyrus; dMPFC=dorsal medial prefronal cortex. All coordinates 




















































Figure 5. Effect of live context on the neural correlates of mentalizing (A) The contrasts 
for the Social Prediction portion between all three conditions. This lateral image depicts 
false detection rate corrected (p<.05) activation up to 16 voxels deep. (B) Activation 
relative to the baseline fixation cross.  Right dMPFC is defined from the Live>Standard 
contrast, and right pSFG and bilateral pSTS are defined based on overlap between 
Live>Social and Live>Standard.  Bar graphs are intended to provide an illustration of 
activation versus baseline and are not presented for statistical purposes.  Abbreviations: 
dMPFC=dorsal medial prefrontal cortex; pSFG=posterior superior frontal gyrus; pSTS= 





















Figure 6. The effect of speaker across both the Story and Social Prediction portions. (A) 
The false discovery rate corrected (p<.05) effect of the Live versus Social speaker 
(matched on pitch and prosody). Overlap between language processing (Story) and 
mentalizing (Social Prediction) experimental portions was found in left posterior superior 
temporal sulcus. (B) The effect of a high-pitched recorded speaker with high prosody 
(Social) versus a lower-pitched, more monotone speaker (Standard).  The higher-pitched 
speaker was subjectively judged as more friendly by participants. The figure depicts 
uncorrected (p<.001, k>25) activation for the Social>Standard speaker contrast.  




Chapter 4: Discussion 
 
 The current study used a novel fMRI paradigm to determine if the neural 
correlates of listening to and thinking about another person were altered when typical 
adults believed they were part of a live interaction, as compared to listening to a 
recording. This novel paradigm was successful in convincing participants they were part 
of a live interaction, and the lower a participant’s level of autistic-like personality traits, 
the more he or she believed they were part of a live interaction. As hypothesized, the 
fMRI data indicated that, although the social cognitive demands were computationally 
identical between recorded and live conditions, the neural correlates of language 
processing and mentalizing were significantly altered by the live context, specifically in 
several regions associated with socio-communicative processing. 
Interpreting Behavioral Results 
 
 Consistent with my hypotheses, on a post-test questionnaire, participants’ 
subjective ratings of perceived liveness were higher in the Live than in the Social and 
Standard conditions. For the Live condition, but not the other two conditions, perceived 
liveness was significantly correlated with AQ scores, even after controlling for other 
subjective ratings including the Live speaker’s likeability. Past research with typical 
populations has linked AQ scores to personality traits, such as extraversion (Austin, 
2005), and social cognitive competence (e.g., detecting mental states based on 
photographs of the eyes; Voracek & Dressler, 2006). In the current study, perhaps 
individuals with higher levels of autistic-like personality traits were less sensitive to the 
cues signaling a live interaction, or the experience of interacting with a person was less 




is also consistent with research that suggests that live or real-time interactions pose a 
greater difficulty for individuals with autism than offline social cognitive computations 
(e.g., Klin, 2000; Klin et al., 2003).  
 Participant ratings of liveness, likeability, and engagement were highest for the 
Live speaker, followed by the Social, and then Standard speaker. The difference between 
the Live and Social speaker on measures of likeability and engagement is somewhat 
surprising, given efforts to match speaker friendliness and attention during each 
condition. However, given the centrality of live interaction to human social experiences, 
it may not be possible to match live and recorded speakers on these dimensions, at least 
without making that live speaker aversive. That is, by virtue of being live, a speaker 
appears more likeable. Future studies could have naïve participants directly compare the 
recordings of the Live and Not-Live speakers, to determine if the Live speaker’s greater 
likeability remains outside of a live context. 
 Although participants claimed to be more attentive and motivated in the Live 
condition, there were no behavioral differences in performance on the Social Prediction 
portion of the task. This null effect was not predicted, but may have been due to the ease 
of the task, as participants were near ceiling for the questions in the current task. Future 
studies employing a live paradigm could include more difficult tasks to rigorously 
examine the effect of a live interaction on behavior (e.g., Auvray et al., 2009), or could 
employ implicit tasks that produce continuous performance measures (e.g., Senju et al., 
2009). Such tasks may also uncover individual differences in such an effect, and future 
work could investigate whether any individual differences may also relate to scores on 




Interpreting Neuroimaging Results 
 
Language processing.  
 
As hypothesized, during the matched Story portion of the experiment, bilateral 
dMPFC, a region linked to social engagement (Van Overwalle, 2011), was more active 
for the Live than Social speaker. This increased activation may be a marker of the social 
salience of the situation, or the perceived increased demand of social processing during a 
live interaction. Interestingly, during the Story portion, no explicit social demand was 
placed on the participant. Although contingency is an important part of live interaction, 
the Story segment ostensibly represents entirely passive listening. Thus, it is noteworthy 
that, even during this portion, the impression of listening to a live speaker was sufficient 
to alter neural activity. 
The left TPJ, as part of the mentalizing network, was not hypothesized to be 
activated in the contrasts for the Story portion of the experiment, although it was 
hypothesized to be involved in the Social Prediction portion. However, left TPJ was 
significantly more active in the Live than Social conditions during the Story. Although 
TPJ is commonly implicated in mentalizing tasks, particularly those that are story-based 
(e.g., false belief stories; Saxe, 2009), a recent meta-analysis found that left TPJ was an 
area of overlapping activation among studies of story-based mentalizing, non-story based 
mentalizing (e.g., cartoon pictures), and general narrative comprehension (Mar, 2011). 
Thus, for this current study, several possible explanations for TPJ activation emerge, 
highlighting the difficulty of inferring whether changes in activation specifically 
implicate language processing or mentalizing. One possibility is that listening to a live 




although the Story portion did not contain any explicit mental states, participants were 
spontaneously representing the live social partner’s potential beliefs and goals. Both 
processes may also be operating in tandem: narrative processing may be altered due to 
participant’s enrichment of the narrative by consideration of the live partner’s mental 
states. Although the current paradigm is unable to dissociate these possibilities, these 
findings provide the first evidence that a live context alone alters the neural correlates of 
language processing. 
In the Live versus Standard comparison, a wide swath of right STS was more 
active, extending from more mid to posterior regions. The peak coordinates of this STS 
activation have been implicated in pitch and prosody perception, which does vary 
between the Live and Standard conditions, but the more posterior activation is spatially 
closer to regions involved in intention and animacy perception, especially given its 
rightward lateralization (Gao, Scholl, & McCarthy, 2012; Pelphrey, Morris, & McCarthy, 
2004; Shultz, Lee, Pelphrey, & McCarthy, 2011). Thus, as suggested by the role of pSTS 
in processing a variety of communicative behaviors, this region’s patterns of activation 
appear to be modulated by a live context.  
As hypothesized, the contrast between the Social and Standard conditions only 
revealed increased activation in STG, which has been consistently implicated in studies 
of pitch and prosody (reviewed in Price, 2010). Given that the Social speaker was rated 
as significantly friendlier and more engaging than the Standard speaker, the lack of an 
effect outside of secondary auditory regions seems to imply that brain is not broadly 
sensitive to the effects of friendliness or sociability, at least in a recorded context. This 




that the goal of the present study was to isolate the effect of liveness, and the Live 
condition had significantly higher ratings of engagement and likeability than either Not-
Live condition. The Social condition, however, was also rated as significantly more 
engaging than likable than the Standard condition. Thus, if neural activation outside of 
auditory regions had appeared similar in both the Live versus Standard and Standard 
versus Social contrasts, it would have indicated to a general effect of attention or 
likeability. Such an effect, however, was not present, suggesting the paradigm was 
successful in isolating the effect of liveness.  
Mentalizing.  
 
 As hypothesized, the neural correlates of making predictions about a social 
partner were significantly different in the Live versus Not-Live conditions. Contrary to 
hypotheses, however, the region most frequently implicated in other studies of mental 
state representation (i.e., right TPJ; Saxe, 2009) was not significantly more active during 
the Live condition than either recorded condition. Rather, bilateral pSTS activation was 
significantly greater in the Live condition than either Not-Live condition. The specific 
comparison between the Live and Standard conditions also revealed, for the Live 
condition, increased activation in regions linked to social engagement (i.e., dMPFC) and 
auditory (i.e., STG) processing. The lack of differential TPJ activity during the Social 
Prediction portion, however, may not be surprising considering the content of the mental 
representations in the current paradigm. The TPJ is most frequently implicated in studies 
of belief representations (e.g., false belief; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013), but the current 
paradigm involves communicated preferences and goals (e.g., “I like watching team 




goal and intention processing (e.g., Vander Wyk et al., 2009). Past studies have 
dissociated the role of the pSTS and TPJ in mentalizing (Gobbini, Koralek, Bryan, 
Montgomery, & Haxby, 2007), and, intriguingly, the specific pattern of pSTS activation 
in this study resembles that found in studies of biological motion processing (Ethofer, 
Gschwind, & Veilleumier, 2011; Grossmann et al., 2000; Thompson, Hardee, 
Panayiotou, Crewther, & Puce, 2007). One possible explanation is that participants are 
mentally visualizing the live, but not recorded, social partners. Another possibility is that 
although this region is also sensitive to biological motion, that sensitivity is indicative of 
a broader sensitivity to processing complex social stimuli (e.g., Redcay, 2008). Although 
future studies could further isolate the role of this specific region, importantly, this is the 
first well-controlled study illustrating that pSTS is sensitive to a live, interactive context, 
even without visual stimuli depicting actions.  
 Contrary to specific hypotheses, both contrasts of Live versus Not-Live 
conditions implicated the same superior frontal region. This region has been linked to a 
diverse set of motoric and attentional functions, including both action observation and 
imitation (Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010). There was no reaction time 
difference between conditions, however, indicating that differences the motor behavior of 
pressing the response button are unlikely to explain this activation difference. Further, in 
an uncorrected comparison (p<.001, k=24), a similar region ([12 22 62]; t=4.05) was 
active in the matched Live versus Social Story portion, which did not contain a motor 
response. Superior frontal regions have also been linked to autobiographical processing 
(Fink et al. 1996; Lee et al., 2002; Ryan et al., 2001), which may provide another 




these possibilities by considering the time course of activation during the Social 
Prediction period. If activation in this region peaks toward the end of the period, when 
participants are making a motor response, it may indicate a motoric explanation, whereas 
earlier activation, when hearing about a person’s goals and preferences, may indicate that 
this region is modulated by socio-communicative context. 
Interpreting patterns of activation and deactivation.  
 
 Interpretation of the current results is complicated by the existence of the default 
mode network (DMN), an interconnected set of regions that become less active when a 
participant is completing a task (Raichle et al., 2001). The regions involved in this 
network overlap with many of the same regions consistently identified in social tasks 
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schilbach et al., 2012; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009), and some 
have theorized that the DMN is implicated in self-reflective processes (e.g., awareness, 
recollection; Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Hunag, & Buckner, 2010; Buckner et al., 2008; 
Spreng & Grady, 2010). The high levels of DMN activity at rest often create difficulties 
when interpreting condition-specific changes relative to baseline (e.g., a fixation cross). 
For example, a study of the effect of person versus object knowledge found that much of 
the increased activation in social brain regions when considering people versus objects 
was driven by relatively less deactivation when thinking about people compared to 
baseline (Mitchell, Heatherton, & Macrae, 2002).  
 Findings relating to the DMN may explain some results in the current study. For 
example, although the Live condition significantly activated dMPFC compared to the 
Social condition, baseline activation in that region was higher than for either 




between the Live and Standard condition during the Story portion. Participants reported 
being significantly less engaged by the Standard than the Social condition. Increased 
mind wandering or decreased attention during the Standard condition could result in 
relatively more dMPFC or TPJ activity in the Standard than Social condition, attenuating 
the differences between the Standard and Live conditions. With the current paradigm, this 
possibility is difficult to disentangle, but is lent some support by the significant 
differences in pSTS activity between the Live and Standard conditions, as this region is 
not consistently implicated in the DMN. Interestingly, for certain regions the Live 
condition resulted in deactivation compared to baseline. This decrease may be due to the 
highly constrained nature of the interaction in the present experiment, which perhaps 
limited the full engagement of self-reflective monitoring systems. It is possible that real-
world, unscripted social interactions more closely resemble spontaneous cognition during 
baseline conditions and would thus not show this pattern of deactivation.  
Comparison of Live vs. Social and Story vs. Social Prediction.  
 
 In terms of comparing the two Not-Live conditions, given the above evidence, 
and given that the Live and Social conditions are matched on pitch and prosody, the Live 
versus Social comparison likely provides a most precise test of the effect of a live 
interaction than Live versus Standard contrasts. In terms of comparing the mentalizing 
and language processing results, although a direct comparison of the Story and Social 
Prediction portions is difficult, general findings seem to indicate that the Story portion 
more strongly engages regions involved in mentalizing and narrative comprehension (i.e., 
TPJ) and representing a social partner (i.e., dMPFC), and the Social Prediction portion 




pSTS). The Story portion also appears to be more left lateralized, compared to bilateral 
activation in the Social Prediction portion. This may be consistent with research 
suggesting that left TPJ is more commonly engaged than right TPJ in non-story based 
mentalizing and narrative comprehension (Mar, 2011) and that left TPJ is selectively 
activated by processing communicative intentions (Ciaramidaro et al., 2007). There was 
also some overlap in left pSTS activation between both Story and Social Prediction 
segments, which may indicate a common representation of a social partner, regardless of 
the specific task.  
 One potential criticism of the current study’s significance is that the regions 
identified as sensitive to live interaction have already been implicated in offline 
approaches to social neuroscience, limiting the insights of a second-person approach. 
This framing, however, overlooks the goal of second-person neuroscience: to 
reconceptualize the brain regions typically studied and discussed in cognitive 
computational framework. That is, conventional framing of the role of TPJ or pSTS often 
involves a focus on the computational load shouldered by these region—for example, 
parsing the representations that make up a belief state or considering how a pattern of 
actions depicts an intention. The current study illustrates that these regions are sensitive 
to a live context across invariant social cognitive computational demands. For example, 
when holding narrative content constant, activity in mentalizing and narrative processing 
regions like pSTS/TPJ is modulated by listening to words spoken by a live social partner.  
 Consistent with the present findings, second-person neuroscience conceptualizes 
social brain regions based on their role in social interaction. As Schilbach and colleagues 




prior to their role in explicit cognitive processing (e.g., the role of TPJ in explicit theory 
of mind). That is, rather than specific regions serving specific cognitive processes, and 
these processes coming together to support social interaction, these brain regions first 
support real-world social engagement. Such a perspective aligns with evidence from 
atypical development that real-world mental state understanding implicitly emerges from 
dynamic social interaction (Klin et al., 2003) and evidence from infancy that regions later 
involved in more explicit mentalizing initially subserve social interaction (e.g., joint 
attention; Grossmann & Johnson, 2010). Thus, although individual paradigms devoid of 
social interaction may find activation in similar social brain regions to the present study, 
such activation may simplify or even misrepresent the more fundamental role of the 
neural networks in supporting real-world social engagement. 
Future data analysis.  
 
Although, for the purposes of the current study, analyses were restricted to the 
proposed hypotheses, this live interaction fMRI data set is rich with possibilities for 
future analysis. For example, participant ratings of liveness and likeability could be added 
to the fMRI analyses as covariates, to attempt to distinguish response patterns that are 
most specific to perceived liveness. Changes in neural responses over the course of the 
experiment could also be examined, as perhaps some of the effect of liveness begins to 
dissipate due to the lack of full reciprocity of interaction in the Live condition. 
Examining activation during the feedback portion of the current paradigm would also be 
informative, given that the literature of social reward has almost exclusively focused on 




Sadato, 2008; Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2010; Lin, Adolphs, & Rangel, 2012; Zeeland et 
al., 2010).    
The analytic approach for the current study was to examine activation in the 
whole brain, but other approaches could also be informative. A subset (n=23) of 
participants completed a theory of mind localizer task in the scanner. This task was 
unrelated to the live paradigm, and involved reading stories about false beliefs and stories 
about false physical representations (e.g., a photograph; Dodell-Feder, Koster-Hale, 
Bedny, & Saxe, 2011). Future work could consider, for individual participants, the 
regions activated by this localizer, and define these as regions of interest (ROIs) for the 
live paradigm. Examining changes for Live versus Not-Live speech in these specific 
ROIs would increase power and increase the ability to conclude effects are specific to 
regions that individual participants use while mentalizing. Other analyses could examine 
measures of functional connectivity, as the brain activates as a unit, and changing 
connectivity could be a more fine-grained measure of sensitivity to live contexts (e.g., 
Rissman, Gazzaley, & D’Esposito, 2004). Item-level analysis could also compare the 
response to mentalizing items that involve an explicit goal (e.g., “I am trying”), those that 
involve a desire (e.g., “I like”), and those that do not involve an explicit mental state verb 
(e.g., “I own”).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
 In addition to future investigations with the collected data set, some 
methodological limitations of current study’s design could guide future work. First, the 
Social Prediction portion concatenates together several different events (e.g., hearing a 




the effects of each portion. Further, this portion is not linguistically matched between the 
Live and Not-Live conditions (e.g., “I want” vs. “Megan wants”). A future study could 
put jitter time between these events, and could also include a control where the recorded 
portion includes first-person sentences (e.g., “I want”). It is possible that simply hearing 
first-person language has similar neural correlates to a more complete live interaction. 
  Another limitation with the current design is that participants briefly met the live 
social partner before the experiment when she explained the video set up. Although this 
interaction is minimal, it makes it impossible to fully dissociate any effect of speaker 
familiarity. Future experiments could limit interaction with the experimenter before the 
fMRI scan begins. Alternatively, future studies could systematically vary the quality of 
the interaction with the experimenter before the study, such that sometimes she follows a 
warm and engaging script, and sometimes she follows a script in which she is cold and 
brusque. This experimental manipulation could also help isolate the effects of liveness 
and likeability.  
Finally, although participants rated their experiences with the manipulation, and 
completed the AQ, they did not complete more implicit, ecologically-valid measures of 
real-world social functioning.  Future research could better connect the results of this live 
paradigm with real-world interactions by extending this paradigm to individuals with 
autism or other social disabilities. There are two potential explanations for the unique 
difficulty of individuals with autism in live social interaction, as opposed to laboratory-
based assessments (e.g., Klin et al., 2003): first, a lack of motivation for live interaction, 
resulting in neural hypoactivation (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012), 




to live stimuli (Dalton et al., 2005; Tanaka & Sung, in press). Extending this paradigm to 
individuals with autism could help disambiguate these two possibilities. 
Relevance to Development 
 
Implications of the current project.  
 
 As mentioned in the introduction, the ultimate goal of this project is to chart the 
development of the social brain from a second-person neuroscience perspective. The 
present study laid the groundwork for this goal in two important ways: first, it tested and 
validated this novel live paradigm; and second, the current results characterized the 
developmental endpoints of second-person neural processing. This characterization was a 
necessary step to contextualize and interpret data from children.  
Practical concerns. The paradigm was previously untested, making it important 
to establish the workability of the paradigm with an adult sample. If children had been 
unable to complete the paradigm, failed to believe the live illusion, or provided data that 
was difficult to interpret, it would have been unclear if this was due to something intrinsic 
to the design, or rather due to the shorter attention spans of children, or their increased 
movement while in the scanner (Van Dijk et al., 2012). Further, our behavioral piloting 
indicated that children often reported that they did not have any suspicions about the live 
set-up, but when debriefed, claim they “knew it all along.” By beginning with adults, we 
were able to use extensive post-testing to determine that 94% of participants believed 
they were in a live interaction. Further, evidence from the current study suggests that the 
comparison of the Live versus Social conditions best captures the effect of a live 
interaction on neural processing. Thus, the future studies with children can eliminate the 




other two conditions. Of course, there may still be difficulties with extending the 
paradigm to children, but the current study provides the foundation for developmental 
studies.  
Characterizing the developmental trajectory. Knowledge of developmental 
endpoints is crucial to a developmental approach (e.g., Apperly et al., 2009). In fields as 
varied as approximate number understanding and implicit memory, developmental 
scientists have sampled adults in order to map developmental trajectories (e.g., 
Cycowicz, Feldman, Snodgrass & Rothstein, 2000; Farrell & Barrett, 2006; Halberda & 
Feigenson, 2008). For example, there are several developmental neural phenomena that 
show U-shaped developmental patterns. Adolescents, as compared to children and adults, 
show heightened nucleus accumbens activation compared to orbitofrontal activation in 
response to rewards (Galvan et al., 2006). In a similar vein, there is evidence that frontal 
activation to fearful faces increases between ages 8 and 15 (Yurgelun-Todd & Killgore, 
2006), but diminishes again in adulthood (Monk et al., 2003). In both examples, studies 
of developmental populations without context from adults would lead to spurious 
conclusions; researchers could infer that reward sensitivity or activation to fearful faces 
increases throughout development. Given such examples, and given that second-person 
neuroscience is almost completely unexplored, the current study helps to anchor and 
contextualize future developmental findings.  
Specifically, the current study provides evidence that there is specialized 
processing of live stimuli, and that this specialization is present in brain regions (e.g., 
pSTS, TPJ) that show protracted structural (e.g., Mills et al., 2014) and functional (Carter 




suggests that between the ages of 7 and 11, the pSTS specializes for biological motion. 
Given that the pSTS activation in the current experiment is spatially similar to activation 
during biological motion perception, the results from the current study yield a clear 
hypothesis that, in late childhood, the processing of live interaction will specialize. 
Similarly, TPJ, another region activated by live interaction in the current study, shows 
specialization between ages 8 and 12, and this specialization correlates with improved 
theory of mind behavioral performance (Gweon, Dodell-Feder, Bedny, & Saxe, 2012; 
Saxe, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Scholz, & Pelphrey, 2009). In contrast, dMPFC, another region 
implicated in the current study, does not seem to show this same pattern of functional 
specialization for belief states in this age range. Thus, an a priori hypothesis for dMPFC 
may be that it is already selectively actives to live conditions by middle childhood. The 
current study makes an important contribution by characterizing the neural correlates of 
live interaction in adulthood, allowing for clearer interpretation of results from future 
studies with developmental populations. 
Future developmental studies.  
 
The next step in this research program is to extend this paradigm to late childhood 
(roughly ages 8-12), which is a time of increased functional specialization in social 
processing regions and great changes in social behavior. During this age range, children 
begin to spend less time with their parents and more time with peers (Lam, McHale, & 
Crouter, 2012), and their social interactions with peers become increasingly complex 
(Farmer et al., in press; Feiring & Lewis, 1991). Socio-emotional understanding increases 
(Carr, 2011), and children also begin to take more risks (e.g., Chilcoat & Anthony, 1996; 




world changes, children improve in laboratory social cognitive tasks, including measures 
of mentalizing (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010) and sarcasm and irony 
comprehension (Capelli, Nakagawa, & Madden, 1990; Pexman & Glenwright, 2007). 
Overall, late childhood represents a time when individual variability in social competence 
widens (Monahan & Steinberg, 2011).  
This individual variability in social competence and experience in late childhood 
lays a foundation for adolescent social functioning, which can predict disorders such as 
anxiety and depression (Bress, Smith, Foti, Klein, & Hajack, 2012; Carr, 2011; Eccles, 
Roeser, Wigfield, & Freedman-Doan, 1999; Meyer, Weinberg, Klein, & Hajack, 2012). 
Late childhood also represents a time when the social skills gap widens between children 
with autism spectrum disorders and their typical peers, as the adaptive skills of children 
with autism, but not necessarily their offline cognitive skills, begin to plateau (Anderson, 
Maye & Lord, 2011; Bal et al., 2013; Kanne et al., 2011). Despite the central role of 
interactive social experience in late childhood, social brain development in this age range 
has been almost exclusively studied in a third-person context. Given this evidence, 
extending this paradigm to developmental populations, and eventually to atypical 
developmental populations, is an important future step. 
Conclusion 
 
Although social cognitive research has suggested that a real-time, interactive 
context can alter behavior, most social neuroscience studies have used “human” as a 
proxy for social, studying the processing of speech by using recordings and studying the 
processing of mental states with stories about characters. The current study’s novel and 




change the brain’s response when processing another’s speech or mental states. This 
finding has implications for studying and quantifying the neural underpinnings of social 
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The purpose of the present study was to determine how individuals respond to live versus 
recorded speech and how individuals respond to live social, non-live social and non-
social rewards. However, due to the need to have each participant experience exactly the 
same live stimuli, the stimuli that you were told were live were actually prerecorded. The 
results from this study are going to be used to help us better understand human social 
development.  
 
There were varying degrees of difficulty, so if you thought that some of the trials were 
easier or harder, you’re not alone.   
 
Thanks again for your participation in this study! If you have any questions, concerns, 
comments, or would like to receive a copy of the report summarizes our findings, please 
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Script for fMRI Session 
 
Kate: Welcome to the Live Language study. We are interested in how the brain processes 
information differently when I’m talking to you directly versus when the computer is 
playing prerecorded audio. To measure your brain responses, you’ll be in the MRI 
scanner. In this setup, you’re laying down in a long tube, with a computer screen directly 
over your face. This makes it difficult to have regular, face-to-face conversation! So 
we’ve constructed a set-up to come close to real-world interaction. 
 
This study has two conditions. In the recorded condition, the computer will play audio 
clips of short stories and questions, and then two answer choices will appear on the 
screen. You’ll press a button to pick the right answer. The computer will then give you 
visual feedback about whether your answer was right or wrong, like a picture of a smiling 
face or a gold star, or a frowning face and a red x. No one else sees your answers, just the 
computer program. 
 
For the live condition, we’ve set up a link between the computer in this room, and the 
computer screen that you’ll be looking at in the scanner. Our goal is to mimic the basic 
characteristics of the recorded stuff, so that the only thing that’s different is the fact that 
it’s live—I’ll be talking directly to you in real time even though you won’t see my face. 
We can’t just have a normal back and forth conversation, since that would be too 
different from the prerecorded condition. 
 
So I’m going to ask you questions in the same audio-only format as the computer’s 
prerecorded questions. Basically, the computer screen will just tell you whether it’s live 
or recorded. And on my computer in here, I’ll see a green light when it’s time to ask you 
a question. 
 
Because the rewards from the computer don’t have any sound, I’m just going to give you 
silent feedback. After I get a cue from my computer to ask you a question, I’ll see your 
button feedback in a small part of my display. So I’ll see if you got it right or wrong. And 
then I’ll nod or give a thumbs up or whatever else I can think of when you get something 
right and I’ll shake my head or give a thumbs down or make a sad face when you get 
something wrong.  
 
We don’t have a two-way audio or video hookup between this computer and you in the 
scanner, so I won’t be able to see your face or hear what you say. There will be a scanner 
operator who will talk to you over the scanner microphone, to remind you to stay still, 
etc., but since I’m not in the official scanner room, I’m not allowed to give safety tips or 





The questions today should be pretty easy, since eventually we’d like to extend this 
project to kids. We still want you to try your best on all the questions, whether I’m the 
one asking or not. You will only have a few seconds to respond to each question, or your 
answer will be marked wrong. 
 
At the end of this main part, you’ll read some short stories and answer questions about 
them. That should take about 10 minutes. And then you’ll be all done. 
Do you have any questions for me? 
 
So I’m going to get set-up in my control room and [Operator name] is going to get you 
set up in the scanner. 
 
Kate walks the participant into the control room and goes back to the side room. 
Operator turns on the volume on the computer in the control room and Kate turns on the 
volume on her computer. The gchat window should already be open. 
 
She then takes the participant into the scan room and gets them all set up. Kate is 
watching the response box via webcam. 
 
Kate: Okay [subject name], I hope you’re okay in there. Let’s test out if I’m getting your 
key presses over at this computer. Press 1 if it’s a weekday and 2 if it’s a weekend.  
 
Participant presses the key and sees either the 1 or the 2 light up on their portion of the 
chat screen.  
 
Assuming a correct answer, Kate gives a positive thumbs up or okay gesture. 
 
Press 1 if it’s May and 2 if it’s June. 
 
Participant presses the key and sees either the 1 or the 2 light up on their portion of the 
chat screen. 
 
Assuming a positive answer, Kate gives a positive thumbs up or okay gesture. 
 
Kate: Looks good over here. [Operator name] will get the experiment started for you. For 
the real experiment, you’re not going to be able to see the light corresponding to your 
answer, since we want your first feedback to be the goldstar or the smiling face or me 
giving a thumbs up. And I only see your answers for the Live items-otherwise it’s just the 
computer. Let’s practice what the real experiment would look like. This time, I’ll just 
give you a thumbs up if you get it right or a thumbs down if you get a wrong. It looks like 
the first question here on my sheet is about what kind of phone I should get, so when I 
see the light on my computer, I’ll know we’ve reached the part of the experiment when 
it’s time to ask you a question. 
 





Kate: All right, awesome job on that one. I wish I didn’t have to check my email all the 
time, data plans are so expensive. Hopefully you did just as well on the computer 
questions! Okay, now it’s time to begin the real experiment. Before I get to talk to you 
again, you’ll watch some pictures of animals and other things. So I’ll talk to you soon! 
 













Individual Items for fMRI Task 
The Story text is the same for all conditions (Live, Social, and Standard), but that the 
prompt and question are different between the Live condition and the Social and Standard 
condition. For the Social and Standard condition, in the prompt, “I” is replaced by a name 
(e.g., “Daniel wants to do some exercise”, and in the question, “I” is replaced by the 
appropriate pronoun (e.g., “he”). 
 
Story Text LIVE prompt LIVE question 
There are two activities after work. One is a pick-
up soccer game and one is a movie premiere. 
I want to do some 
exercise. 
Which activity 
should I do? 
The zoo has two animal shows. There is an indoor 
tiger show and a dolphin show in water. 
I do not want to 
get wet. 
Which show 
should I watch? 
There are two apartments for rent. One has a big 
bedroom closet and one has a big kitchen. 
I have a lot of 
clothes. 
Which apartment 
should I rent? 
The are two phone apps that cost a dollar. One has 
cooking recipes and one has movie reviews. 
I am hosting a big 
dinner party next 
week. 
Which app 
should I buy? 
There are two things on the breakfast menu. One is 
pancakes and one is a bowl of fruit. 
I am trying to eat 
healthy. 
Which food 
should I eat? 
There are two restaurants for brunch. One is a big 
restaurant and one is a small coffee shop. 
I want to have 
lots of guests at 
brunch. 
Where should I 
go for brunch? 
There are two cafeterias in the office building. One 
has just tea and the other has juice drinks. 
I don't like tea 
that much. 
Which cafe 
should I visit? 
There are two ways to carry things. Purses look 
nice and backpacks can hold a lot of stuff. 
I have to carry a 
lot of books. 
Which should I 
bring with me to 
school? 
There are two kinds of desserts in the cookbook. 
Cake takes an hour and fruit takes 15 minutes. 
I am in a rush to 
school. 
Which kind of 
dessert should I 
make? 
There are two restaurants for dinner. One serves 
fancy French food and one is a fast food restaurant. 
I want to go 
somewhere nice 
on a date. 
Where should I 
go for dinner? 
There are two types of exercise. Running is good 
for speed and lifting weights is good for strength. 
I want to move 
heavy things. 
Which type of 
exercise should I 
do? 
 
There are two hotels in the town. One has a 
waterpark and one is a bed and breakfast. 
 
I want a quiet 
room to sleep in. 
 
Which hotel 
should I stay at? 
There are two kinds of books at the library book 
sale. There are short stories and long novels. 
I like spending a 
lot of time 
reading. 
What kind of 





There is a math test soon. There is a month-long 
review class and a one week review class. 
I got an A on the 
last math test. 
Which class 
should I take? 
There are two microwaves to buy. One is large red 
microwave and one is a small white microwave. 




should I buy? 
 
There are two things for a snack. One is strawberry 
yogurt and one is a bagel with butter. 
 




should I eat? 
There are two ways to move. Things can be tightly 
packed in cardboard boxes or carried by hand. 
I need to move an 
expensive vase. 
How should I 
move my vase? 
There are two showings of the new comedy movie. 
One is at 7pm and one is at 10pm. 
I like going to 
bed early. 
What time 
should I see the 
movie? 
There are two necklaces for sale. One is a long 
silver chain and one is a gold choker. 
I need more gold 
jewelry. 
Which necklace 
should I pick? 
There are two new TV shows. One is on the 
History Channel and one is on Cartoon Network. 
I want to watch 
true stories. 
Which TV 
channel should I 
watch? 
There are two new night classes. Pottery class is on 
Tuesdays and the music class in on Mondays. 
I have to work 
late on Mondays. 
Which class 
should I take? 
Two places host parties. During the day, the pool is 
open and at night, the restaurant is open. 
I want to have my 
party at night. 
Where should I 
have my party? 
The new phone has two cases. One has bright 
colors and patterns and one is black and gray. 
I like phones with 
dark colors. 
What phone 
should I pick? 
There are two popular TV shows on at 9pm. One is 
a comedy and one is a drama. 
I like shows that 
are funny. 
Which type of 
show should I 
watch? 
There is a science test coming up. There is an 
expensive review class and a cheap review class. 
I am trying to 
save money. 
Which class 
should I take? 
Two kinds of shirts are on sale at the department 
store. T-shirts are cheap and turtlenecks are 
expensive. 
I need new winter 
clothes. 
Which shirt 
should I buy? 
There are two recently released computer games. 
One is a solitaire game and one is a racing game. 




should I buy? 
There are two sofas for sale. There is a soft brown 
sofa and a small brown wooden sofa. 
I need 
comfortable 
furniture for my 
living room. 
Which sofa 
should I buy? 
There are two teams at the gym. There is a 
beginning basketball team and an expert golf team. 
I like being very 
active. 
Which sport 
should I play? 
There are two kinds of pets for sale at the store. 
There are colorful goldfish and beagle puppies. 
I like playing 
with animals. 
What kind of pet 
should I pick? 
There are two suburbs outside the city. One is 
close to the metro and one is far away. I don't own a car. 
Which suburb 




There are two things to wear for summer exercise. 
There are athletic shorts and there are bathing suits. 
I am going to a 
water park. 
Which clothes 
should I wear? 
There are two new movies in theaters. One is a 
romantic comedy and one is a scary movie. 
I really like to 
laugh. 
Which movie 
should I see? 
There are two sports to watch. There is a college 
football rivalry game and there is women's 
gymnastics. 
I like watching 
team sports. 
Which sport 
should I watch? 
There are two types of wallpaper. One has lots of 
flowers and leaves and one has blue stripes. 
I really like being 
outdoors. 
Which wallpaper 
should I pick? 
There are two places to buy the book. The 
bookstore is more expensive and the website is 
cheaper. 
I would like to 
save money. 
Where should I 








Below is a list of statements. Please read each statement very carefully and rate how 









































If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy to 











I frequently get so strongly absorbed in one thing 





















I usually notice car number plates or similar 











Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve said 











When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine 





















In a social group, I can easily keep track of several 

















































































I tend to have very strong interests which I get 





















When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to get a 





















When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to 











































































I find it easy to “read between the lines” when 











I usually concentrate more on the whole picture, 









      

































I don’t usually notice small changes in a situation, 

































When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when it’s 

































I find it easy to work out what someone is 











If there is an interruption, I can switch back to 

































When I was young, I used to enjoy playing games 











I like to collect information about categories of 
things (e.g., types of car, types of bird, types of 












I find it difficult to imagine what it would be like 















































































































































Project Title: Functional brain organization in typical development 
 
Date: __________________ Participant ID # __________ 
 
This information will only be used to determine the demographics of our sample 
population. 
All responses will be kept confidential and will only be identified with a number that is 
not 




1. Participant’s Age (Years and months): _____________________ 
 
2. Participant’s Gender: ___Male ___Female 
 
3. Participant’s Ethnicity (please check one): 
____  Hispanic or Latino 
____ Not Hispanic or Latino 
____  Does not wish to disclose 
 
4. Participant’s Race: (More than one option may be checked) 
_____ American Indian or Alaskan Native  
_____ Asian  
_____ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander  
____  White or Caucasian 
_____ Black or African American  
_____ Does not wish to disclose 
 
5. Number and ages of siblings: 
_______________________________________________ 
 
6. Have you been exposed to a language other than English? ____ yes ____ no 
If yes, in what way (please note extent of exposure, duration, and fluency level)? 
 
5. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Some High School ______ 
High School ______ 
Some College ______ 
Technical or AA Degree ______ 
College Degree ______ 









6. What is the highest level of education completed by your parents? 
Parent 1 Parent 2 
Some High School  ______  ______ 
High School   ______  ______  
Some College   ______   ______ 
Technical or AA Degree ______  ______ 
College Degree  ______  ______ 
Some Graduate School ______   ______ 




1. Which is your dominant hand?  ___Left  ___Right  ___Use both hands 
2. Please indicate which hand you would ordinarily use for each activity. 
a. Write     Left   Right   Either hand 
b. Draw    Left   Right   Either hand  
c. Use a bottle opener   Left   Right   Either hand 
d. Throw a snowball    Left   Right   Either hand 
e. Use a hammer   Left   Right   Either hand 
f. Use a toothbrush    Left   Right   Either hand 
g. Use a screwdriver   Left   Right   Either hand 
h. Use an eraser    Left   Right   Either hand 
i. Use a pair of scissors   Left   Right   Either hand 
j. Use a tennis racket    Left   Right   Either hand 
k. Hold a match when striking it  Left   Right   Either hand 
l. Stir a can of paint    Left   Right   Either hand 
 
3. At any point in your life, were you forced to switch from your dominant hand to your 
less 
dominant hand? ___Yes ___No 
 
4. Is anyone in your family (e.g., parents, brothers, sisters) or any other blood relative left 
handed? ___Yes ___No 
 
a. If yes, which family member(s) are left handed? _______________________________ 
 
5. Are there times when you find yourself using your less dominant hand for the very 
same 
things that you would normally do with your dominant hand? 
___Yes ___No 






b. Which of the following is the reason for use of the less dominant hand? 
- Consciously trying to use it more ___Yes ___No 
- Due to injury or impairment ___Yes ___No 





























Note: Different versions of this questionnaire were given to the participants from whom we 
have already collected data. Items given to all N=17 participants are denoted with an 
asterisk and additional items given to N=8 of those participants are denoted with a double 
asterisk. The blocks about the different conditions (i.e., Live, Social, Standard) were 
randomized. Items which will compose the “liveness” index for each condition are bolded. 
 
 
1*) What were your overall impressions? 
 
 
2*) How many different people’s voices did you hear? 
 
1 2  3 4 More than 4 
 
We actually designed the study so that in addition to hearing the live speaker, you heard two 
other people: an older woman with a more monotone voice and a younger speaker with a 
more engaging voice. We’re now going to ask you some questions about those speakers you 
heard. 
 




3*) How much did you like this speaker? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Disliked    Neutral     Liked 
A lot           A lot 
 
 
4*) How much did you pay attention when she was talking? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very      Neutral    Very 
Little           Much 
 
 
   5*) How motivated were you to get the questions asked in her voice right? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very     Neutral     Very 




6*) How much did your experiences with her feel live? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not at      Neutral    Very 
all live           Live 
 
When she asked the questions, you saw either gold stars or red Xs.  
 
7*) How did you feel when you received feedback that you got the right answer? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very      Neutral    Very 
Negative          Positive 
 
 





9*) How did you feel when you received feedback that you got the wrong answer? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very      Neutral    Very 
Negative          Positive 
 
10) How much did it feel like this speaker was talking directly to you? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not at all    Neutral    Felt like she was 
direct          talking to me 
          directly 
 
Think about that second recorded speaker, who had a more high pitched voice [play clip] 
 
11*) How much did you like this speaker? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Disliked    Neutral     Liked 
A lot           A lot 
 
12*) How much did you pay attention when she was talking? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very     Neutral     Very 





13*) How motivated were you to get the questions asked in her voice right? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very     Neutral     Very 
Unmotivated          Motivated 
 
 
14*) How much did your experiences with her feel live? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not at     Neutral     Very 
all live           Live 
 
When she asked the questions, you saw either smiling faces or sad faces. 
 
15*) How did you feel when you received feedback that you got the right answer? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very     Neutral     Very 
Negative          Positive 
 





17*) How did you feel when you received feedback that you got the wrong answer? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very     Neutral     Very 
Negative          Positive 
 
 
18) How much did it feel like this speaker was talking directly to you? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not at all    Neutral    Felt like she was  
direct          talking to me 
          directly 
 








19*) How much did you like this speaker? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Disliked    Neutral     Liked 
A lot           A lot 
 
20*) How much did you pay attention when she was talking? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very     Neutral     Very 
Little           Much 
 
 
21*) How motivated were you to get the questions asked in her voice right? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very     Neutral     Very 
Unmotivated          Motivated 
 
 
22*) How much did your experiences with her feel live? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not at     Neutral     Very 
all live           Live 
 
When she asked the questions, she would give you positive or negative feedback. 
 
23*) How did you feel when you received feedback that you got the right answer? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very     Neutral     Very 
Negative          Positive 
 
 




 [If yes] 
25*) How did you feel when you received feedback that you got the wrong answer? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very     Neutral     Very 





26*) How much did it feel like this speaker was talking directly to you? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not at all    Neutral    Felt like she was  
direct          talking to me 
          directly 
 
27*) Did any particular items or questions seem strange? 
 
 
28*) How hard was the task? How hard was it to pay attention? 
 
 
29*) Did the volume and audio characteristics seem fairly consistent? 
 
 
30*) Were there times when the live speaker felt like she was interacting with you more 
than other times? 
 
 
31*) Do you think there was anything more to the study than what we told you about? 
 
 
32) If yes, what was more to the study than we told you about? 
 
 
33*) Do you have any other thoughts about the task to share with us? 
 
 
34**) How much did it feel like the Live speaker was interacting with you directly 
in real time versus sounding like a recording?  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Felt like I     Neutral    Felt like she  
was listening         she was talking 




35) How was your interaction with the live speaker before the start of the main part of 
the experimenter?  
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very     Neutral     Very 






36) How much do you think you would like interacting with her again in real life?  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not at all     Neutral   Very much 
            
 
37**) How much did it feel like the higher pitched speaker was interacting with you 
directly in real time versus sounding like a recording?  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Felt like I     Neutral    Felt like she  
was listening         she was talking 
to a recording         to me directly 
 
38) How much do you think you would like interacting with her again in real life?  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not at all     Neutral   Very much 
 
 
39**) How much did it feel like the lower pitched speaker was interacting with you 
directly in real time versus sounding like a recording?  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Felt like I     Neutral    Felt like she  
was listening         she was talking 
to a recording         to me directly 
 
 
40) How much do you think you would like interacting with her again in real life?  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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